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ABSTRACT: The fracture in the emerging discipline of biosemiotics when the code biologist 
Marcello Barbieri claimed that Peircian biosemiotics is not genuine science raises anew the 
question: What is science? When it comes to radically new approaches in science, there is no 
simple answer to this question, because if successful, these new approaches change what is 
understood to be science. This is what Galileo, Darwin and Einstein did to science, and with 
quantum theory, opposing interpretations are not merely about what theory is right, but what 
is real science. Peirce’s work, as he acknowledged, is really a continuation of efforts of Schelling 
to challenge the heritage of Newtonian science for the very good reason that the deep 
assumptions of Newtonian science had made sentient life, human consciousness and free will 
unintelligible, the condition for there being science. Pointing out the need for such a revolution 
in science has not succeeded as a defence of Peircian biosemiotics, however. In this paper, I will 
defend the scientific credentials of Peircian biosemiotics by relating it to the theoretical biology 
of the bio-mathematician, Robert Rosen. Rosen’s relational biology, focusing on anticipatory 
systems and giving a place to final causes, should also be seen as a rigorous development of the 
Schellingian project to conceive nature in such a way that the emergence of sentient life, mind 
and science are intelligible. Rosen has made a very strong case for the characterization of his 
ideas as a real advance not only in science, but in how science should be understood, and I will 
argue that it is possible to provide a strong defence of Peircian biosemiotics as science through 
Rosen’s defence of relational biology. In the process, I will show how biosemiotics can and 
should become a crucial component of anticipatory systems theory. 
KEYWORDS: Biosemiotics; Anticipatory Systems; Code biology, Relational biology; C.S. 
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1 This paper is the development of a presentation to the Nineteenth Gathering of Biosemiotics held at 
Lomonsov Moscow State University in July, 2019.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1990s a number of theoretical biologists influenced by Thomas 
Sebeok’s call for a fusion of biology and semiotics formed a new international 
research program, biosemiotics, giving rise to annual conferences or 
‘Gatherings’ beginning in 2001, and then in 2008, a new journal, Biosemiotics.2 
Strongly influenced by C.S. Peirce, Sebeok was the world’s most influential 
proponent of semiotics as a bridge between the sciences and the humanities.3 
The term biosemiotics was coined by Friedrich Rothschild in 1962, and was 
embraced and promoted by Sebeok after his discovery of the work of the 
theoretical biologist Jakob von Uexküll and meeting his son, Thure von 
Uexküll. It was taken up and developed at a number of meetings between 
Sebeok, Thure Uexküll and others in Germany in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
and then in Denmark, most importantly, by Jesper Hoffmeyer, Claus 
Emmeche, Frederik Stjernfelt and Søren Brier. The Danes in particular were 
strongly influenced by Peirce, and Peircian biosemiotics was effectively 
launched with the publication of Hoffmeyer and Emmeche’s essay ‘Code-
Duality and the Semiotics of Nature’ in 1991, the 1991 edition of The Semiotic 
Web as Biosemiotics in 1992, the first book with ‘Biosemiotics’ in the title, and 
Hoffmeyer’s Signs of  Meaning in the Universe published in Danish in 1993.4 The 
 
2 The history of biosemiotics has been written from different perspectives by its founders, notably Kalevi 
Kull, ‘Semiotic Paradigm in Theoretical Biology’. In: K. Kull and T. Tiivel (eds.) Lectures in Theoretical 
Biology: The Second Stage, Tallinn: Estonian Academy of Sciences, 1993: pp.52-62; Kalevi Kull, ‘Biosemiotics 
in the twentieth century: a view from biology’, Semiotica 127(1/4), 1999: 385-414; Thomas A. Sebeok, 
‘Biosemiotics: Its Roots, Proliferation, and Prospects’, in Thomas A. Sebeok, Global Semiotics, Bloomington: 
University of Indiana Press, 2001, ch.3; Claus Emmeche, ‘Taking the semiotic turn, or how significant 
philosophy of biology should be done’, Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1), 2002: 155-162; Claus 
Emmeche, Kalevi Kull and Frederik Stjernfelt, Reading Hoffmeyer, rethinking biology, Tartu: Tartu University 
Press, 2002; Donald Favareau, ‘The Evolutionary History of Biosemiotics’, Introduction to Biosemiotics: The 
New Biological Synthesis, ed. Marcello Barbieri, Dordrecht: Springer, 2008, pp.1-68;  Marcello Barbieri, A 
Short History of Biosemiotics’, Biosemiotics, Issue 2, 2008: 221-245; and Jesper Hoffmeyer, ‘A short history 
of Gatherings in Biosemiotics’, Gatherings in Biosemiotics, ed. Silver Rattasepp and Tyler Bennett, Tartu: 
University of Tartu Press, 2012, pp.55-60. 
3 Thomas A. Sebeok, ‘Semiotics as Bridge Between Humanities and Sciences’, in Semiotics as  Bridge Between 
The Humanities and the Sciences, ed. Paul Perron et.al. N.Y.: Legas, 2000, 76-100. Earlier, Sebeok had 
promoted Peircian semiotics as the basis for unifying the sciences. See Thomas A. Sebeok, The Sign & Its 
Masters, Austin: Uni. of Texas Press,1979, p.64ff. 
4 Jesper Hoffmeyer and Claus Emmeche, ‘‘Code-Duality and the Semiotics of Nature’, in On Semiotic 
Modeling, ed. Myrdene Anderson and Floyd Merrell, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991, pp.117-166, and 
Thomas A. Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok eds, Biosemiotics: The Semiotic Web of 1991, Berlin: Mouton de 
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extension of semiotics to biology had been promoted in the 1970s by a number 
of figures along with Sebeok, including René Thom in France (also influenced 
by Peirce) and Giorgia Prodi and Umberto Eco in Italy, but also by Yuri 
Lotman in Estonia, the founder or the Tartu/Moscow school of semiotics.5 
Estonia was also the original homeland of Jakob von Uexküll. Estonia thus 
provided a receptive environment for Peircian biosemiotics which was taken up 
and vigorously promoted by Kalevi Kull, who visited Hoffmeyer in Denmark 
in 1994.  
Peircian biosemiotics was and is a radical challenge to mainstream thinking 
in biology, and as such has had to struggle for recognition. In place of the 
centrality presently accorded to biochemistry and molecular biology, taking life 
to be a special kind of chemical process, the biosemioticians argue that it is 
signs which define life, and that it is only through understanding these signs, 
how they are produced and responded to, that life can be understood. Initially 
great progress was made. Code biologists (or ‘semantic biologists’) and 
biohermeneuticists had developed parallel research programs to Peircian 
biosemiotics, and the code biologists led by Marcello Barbieri and the 
biohermeneuticists led by Sergey Chebanov and Anton Markoš joined forces 
with the biosemioticians. Later, inspired by these developments, Günther 
Witzany developed another approach to biology based on the pragmatics of 
language focussing on communication, and also joined the biosemiotics 
movement. Barbieri co-edited the first edition of Biosemiotics with Hoffmeyer, 
and edited the first issue, much of it devoted to the codes of life. In 2008 Jesper 
Hoffmeyer published a major work of synthesis, Biosemiotics: An Examination into 
the Signs of  Life and the Life of  Signs, which along with Donald Favareau’s 
anthology Essential Readings in Biosemiotics and later, Vincius Romanini and 
Eliseo Fernández’s Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of  Life, could 
function as textbooks for courses on biosemiotics.6 
 
Gruyter, 1992, and Jesper Hoffmeyer, [1993] Signs of Meaning in the Universe, trans. Barbara J. Haveland, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. 
5 See Kalevi Kull, ‘Towards biosemiotics with Yuri Lotman’, Semiotica, 127 (1/4), 1999, 115-131. 
6 Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of Signs, trans. Jesper Hoffmeyer and 
Donald Favareau, Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2008, Favareau, (ed.) Essential Readings in 
Biosemiotics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010, and Romanini and Fernández (eds.) Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at 
the Riddle of Life, Dordrecht: Springer, 2014. 
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Then in 2012, Barbieri withdrew from the movement, resigning his 
editorship of Biosemiotics. He claimed that the influence of Peircian semiotics 
had resulted in biosemiotics research moving away from genuine science, and 
that this was standing in the way of biosemiotics gaining acceptance by 
mainstream biologists. He claimed he had been unsuccessful in convincing 
Peircians to move on to a more genuinely scientific form of biosemiotics.7  
This charge raises the question again, What is science?  And, how can any 
research justify its claim to being scientific?  
Here I will not only defend the claim of Peircian biosemiotics to being 
scientific, but argue that it involves a revolution in scientific thought that 
requires us to alter to some extent our understanding of what science is, and 
that this should have been undertaken long ago. This revolution was called for 
by Friedrich Schelling at the end of the Eighteenth Century in his effort to 
develop a philosophy that would unite science, history and the arts. The failure 
to fully carry through this revolution, required to make life and mind 
intelligible, is now hindering not only the advance of biology (and medicine), 
but all science, and also, the humanities. It is also damaging major economic, 
social, political and cultural institutions, including universities which have 
abandoned the Humboldtian model  and ideal of education that inspired 
academics in the sciences and humanities for nearly two hundred years, and 
blocking effective action in response to the global ecological crisis. As Sebeok 
argued, biosemiotics is required to spearhead a revolution to bridge and 
overcome the division between science and the humanities and to revive the 
values that the humanities originally were designed to promote. And as 
Hoffmeyer argued in Signs of  Meaning in the Universe, a book that became a 
manifesto for Peircian biosemioticians, biosemiotics is required for us to 
appreciate the signs of life in the global ecosystem and to appreciate and 
respond properly to these signs, which now, with a global ecological crisis 
facing us, should be regarded as imperative.8 
According to Barbieri in his 2014 critique of Peircian biosemiotics, there are 
 
7 Marcello Barbieri, ‘From Biosemiotics to Code Biology’, Biological Theory, 9(2), June, 2014: 139-149. doi  
10.1007/s13752-013-0155-6 
8 As I have tried to show in ‘The Semiotics of Global Warming: Combating Semiotic Corruption’, Theory 
and Science, 2007: 1-35. 
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three schools of biosemiotics, one aligned with Saussure’s structuralist 
semiology (originating in the work of Marcel Florkin), one aligned with Peircian 
semiotics, and one aligned with code theory, although he had acknowledged 
other approaches in his study of the history of biosemiotics in 2008, including a 
line developed from physics by Howard Pattee.9 Structuralist semiotics as it was 
developed by the Russian Roman Jakobson accorded a central to place to 
codes and can be seen as linking while adding another dimension to Peirciean 
biosemiotics.10 Barbieri himself is a leading exponent of code biology, inspired 
by the discovery of the genetic code to find other biological codes.  
The genetic code, based on arbitrary, or conventional rules, in the sense 
that any sequence of DNA can be associated to any amino acid without a 
deterministic link between them, is now almost universally accepted as a major 
achievement of science. Barbieri has achieved international recognition for his 
work explaining how the genetic code works. He identified the ‘ribotype’, the 
‘ribonucleoprotein system’ as the code maker of the genetic code which, and 
argued it could account for the origin of life before the sharp differentiation 
between genes and proteins, and should be recognized as having equal standing 
with the genotype and the phenotype.11 He has offered an explanation for how 
the code could have formed in the first place through ‘ambiguity reduction’, 
and has been involved in the discovery of other codes. His standing in science 
as a leading spokesperson for code biology is relatively secure.12  
Hoffmeyer himself discussed Barbieri’s claims for code biology in his 2008 
publication, Biosemiotics, and while arguing that he still underestimated the 
complexity of the relationship between DNA, RNA, the production of proteins 
and other aspects of heredity, and that codes do not entirely explain the 
 
9 Marcello Barbieri, ‘From Biosemiotics to Code Biology’, Biological Theory, 9(2), June, 2014: 139-149. doi  
10.1007/s13752-013-0155-6 and Barbieri, ‘A Short History of Biosemiotics.’ 
10 Structuralism developed in different directions, with mainstream structuralism following Saussure and 
focussing on the relationship between signs leading to post-structuralism and extreme skepticism, while 
the genetic structuralism of Jean Piaget, focussing on the actions of organisms and people and attempting 
to account for the development of language, science and mathematics on this basis, was more 
commensurate with Peircian semiotics and biosemiotics.  
11 Marcello Barbieri, ‘The Ribotype Theory on the Origin of Life’, J. Theor. Biol. 91, 1981: 545-601, and 
Marcello Barbieri, The Organic Codes: An Introduction to Semantic Biology, Cambridge: CUP, 2003. 
12 For a review of his book, The Organic Codes, see Arnon Levi and Eva Jablonka, ‘Book Review’, Acta 
Biotheoretica, 52: 2004: 65-69. 
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production of proteins, he accepted that this was a major advance in genetics. 
Tacitly, he was claiming that Peircian biosemiotics provides a unifying 
framework in which the achievements of all the other biosemioticians can be 
appreciated and integrated, while other approaches are limited in one way or 
another.13 Barbieri denies this, claiming there is no unifying principle among 
biosemioticians and that Peircian biosemiotics is merely a different way of 
looking at the same facts without being able to produce new facts and without 
the power to predict, or even to have its own experimental field. 
The significance of Barbieri’s claim made from his standpoint as an 
established scientist that much of Peircian biosemiotics is ‘unscientific’ cannot 
be underestimated. It is to brand Peircian biosemiotics, which includes much of 
the work of Hoffmeyer and which now has the allegiance of a number of 
leading theoretical biologists around the world, as fake science. This is a 
paradoxical claim when one considers that the main goal of C.S. Peirce as a 
logician was to characterize and defend genuine science. In a culture in which 
science has almost completely monopolised claims to cognitive validity 
(deconstructive postmodernists in the humanities having effectively capitulating 
to technoscience), it is to eliminate the challenge of Peircian biosemioticians to 
deep assumptions of modernity put in place by Descartes and Newton which 
have generated a culture of nihilism indifferent to life and humanity.14 
Defences of Peircian biosemiotics have been offered. It has already been 
pointed out by Søren Brier that what is really at issue is what counts as 
science.15 Then in 2018 Frederico Vega published a paper arguing that Peircian 
biosemiotics and Barbieri’s code biology could be reconciled through the work 
of the theoretical biologist and mathematician Robert Rosen on relational 
biology modelling anticipatory systems.16 Barbieri quickly responded to this, 
rejecting this claim and also criticising various claims Rosen had made, 
 
13 See ‘The Semiotics of Heredity’, in Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics, ch.2, p.139f. 
14 Arran Gare, Nihilism Incorporated: European Civilization and Environmental Destruction, Bangalore: Eco-Logical 
Press, 1993. 
15 S. Brier, ‘Can biosemiotics be a "science" if its purpose is to be a bridge between the natural, social and 
human sciences?’, Progress in Biophysics & Molecular Biology, 119(3), December 2015: 622-633. 
16 Federico Vega, ‘A Critique of Barbieri’s Code Biology Through Rosen’s Relational Biology: 
Reconciling Barbieri’s Biosemiotics with Peircian Biosemiotics, Biological Theory, 14 (1):21-29 (2019). doi: 
10.1007/s13752-018-0312-z  
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particularly the claim that mechanistic explanations are reductionist.17 He also 
rejected Rosen’s claim that his mathematical model of life itself cannot be 
simulated on a computer and so is radically different from a Turing machine. 
He defended mechanistic explanations as a defining feature of genuine science 
while still being opposed to ontological reductionism. He also argued also that 
genuine science requires the identification of observables by virtue of which 
theories can be verified or falsified. My main concern here is defend the 
scientific status of Peircian biosemiotics, and I also will use the work of Rosen 
to do this. However, my approach to this is somewhat different from that of 
Vega. I will attempt to interpret Rosen through Peirce’s philosophy primarily 
as a clarification of what science is, and then use this characterization of science 
to interpret and defend Peircian biosemiotics.  
In doing so, I will offer minor amendments to both Rosen’s arguments and 
to Peircian philosophy and to positions taken by biosemioticians. As an original 
mathematician concerned to advance both mathematics and mathematical 
biology in a way that accords a place in science to final causes, greatly 
clarifying the role of mathematics in science, Rosen defended a conception of 
science that I will show can also be used to reveal the limits of mathematics in 
science and to justify the cognitive value of both non-mathematical scientific 
models and to narratives. Against Rosen I will argue that mechanistic 
explanations are not necessarily reductionist, that is, that all appearances are 
nothing but the effects of the actions and interactions between component 
entities used to explain these appearances, but against Barbieri that genuine 
science is not defined by its capacity to provide mechanistic explanations. What 
is required, I will argue, is that explanations be in terms of models of causation, 
and not all causation is mechanistic. The importance of Rosen’s work was to 
both clarify the nature of causation and also what is involved in modelling it, 
and through his work in mathematics, to reveal new dimensions of causation 
that can give a place to final causes. It is through this more complex 
understanding of causation, with a central place accorded to immanent 
causation or self-organization of processes that are components of each other 
 
17 Marcello Barbieri, ‘Code Biology, Peircian Biosemiotics and Rosen’s Relational Biology’, Biological 
Theory 14 (1):21-29 (2019). doi. 10.1007/s13752-018-0312-z  
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without being reducible to each other, that I will try to explain and, in so doing, 
defend Peircian notions of semiosis. At the same time I will suggest that Peirce 
was deficient in not giving an adequate place to immanent causation, 
presupposing rather than offering an analysis of the causation involved in 
semiosis.18 
In making these arguments, relating Peircian biosemiotics and Rosen’s 
relational biology, I will suggest that both should be understood as part of and 
contributions to a broader tradition of philosophy and science going back to 
the work of Schelling, the originator of the modern tradition of process 
metaphysics.19 This accords with Peirce’s own characterization of his work in a 
letter to William James: ‘My views were probably influenced by Schelling … by 
all stages of Schelling, but especially by the Philosophie der Natur. I consider 
Schelling enormous … If you were to call my philosophy Schellingianism 
transformed in the light of modern physics, I should not take it hard.’20 Taking 
as his point of departure the conception of life developed by Kant in Critique of  
Judgement along with Kant’s dynamic conception of matter and constructivist 
philosophy of mathematics, Schelling called for a speculative physics to replace 
Newtonian physics, and more fundamentally, Cartesian dualism, developing 
new concepts adequate to the reality of life so conceived, and through that, to 
the reality of mind.21 This involved inverting the status accorded to physics and 
biology, making biology the reference point for defining what is science. It is 
this above all else that Peircian biosemiotics and Rosennian relational biology 
have in common. 
There are more reasons than this for identifying and relating biosemiotics 
and relational biology to a Schellingian tradition of natural philosophy and 
science, however. Part of the current crises in science, in physics as well as 
 
18 I have argued this at greater length in Arran Gare, ‘The Semiotics of Global Warming: Combating 
Semiotic Corruption’, Theory & Science, 2007, pp.1-32, p.5f. 
19 See Arran Gare, ‘From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics: On the Way to Ecological 
Civilization’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 7(2), 2011: 26-69. 
20 Letter dated January 28th, 1894, quoted by Joseph L. Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature, 
Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1977, p.203.  
21 F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Petersen, 2004, p.193ff. 
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biology, is the failure to recognize this tradition.22 Virtually every major 
advance in the natural sciences since Schelling is a realization and validation of 
this alternative tradition, as Joseph Esposito, Marie-Luise Heuser-Kessler and 
Keith Peterson have pointed out.23 Thomas Kuhn showed that all the major 
figures who laid the foundations for thermodynamics with its first law, the 
conservation of energy, were influenced by Schelling’s Naturphilosophie.24 
Advances in thermodynamics, including efforts to understand life through 
thermodynamics inspired by the energeticists who took energy or mass-energy 
as the basis for defining and comprehending physical existence, including 
Aleksandr Bogdanov’s Tektology, Alfred Lotka’s biophysics, Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy’s notion of open systems and Ilya Prigogine’s notion of dissipative 
structures, are the outcome of this development, now generally recognized as 
major achievements in science. Schelling’s call for a new physics integrating the 
study of light, electricity and magnetism was also successful. Michael Faraday 
was indirectly influenced by the Naturphilosophen and Schelling embraced the 
work of Faraday with his notion of force fields as the fulfilment of 
Naturphilosophie.25 Maxwell’s achievement of explaining light through electro-
magnetic fields took Schelling’s project even further. It was efforts to reconcile 
Maxwell’s work with Newtonian mechanics that generated the theories of 
relativity and then quantum theory. These should also be understood as field 
theories.26 Schelling’s conjecture that chemicals and chemical processes could 
be understood as the result of opposing forces balancing each other underlies 
 
22 See Arran Gare, ‘Overcoming the Newtonian paradigm: The unfinished project of theoretical biology 
from a Schellingian perspective’, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 113, December: 5-24, and Arran 
Gare, ‘Natural Philosophy and the Sciences: Challenging Science’s Tunnel Vision’, Philosophies, 3(4), Dec. 
2018: 1-29. https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/3/4  
23 Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature, Marie-Luise Heuser-Kessler, Die Produktivität der Natur: 
Schellings Naturphilosophie und das neue Paradigma der Selbsorganization in den Naturwissenschaften, Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot, 1986, and Keith Petersen, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to Schelling, First Outline of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature, pp.xi-xxxv. See also Gare, ‘Overcoming the Newtonian paradigm’. 
24 Thomas S. Kuhn, ‘Energy conservation as an example of simultaneous discovery’. In: Thomas Kuhn, 
The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, ch.4. 
25 Michael Faraday, ‘Letter 836 – William Whewell to Faraday, 23rd November, 1835’. In: The 
Correspondence of Michael Faraday, Volume 2: 1832-1840; Frank, A.; James, J.L., Eds.; The Institution of 
Electrical Engineers: London, 1991, p.296-297. 
26 See Arran Gare, ‘Chreods, Homeorhesis and Biofields: Finding the Right Path for Science through 
Daoism’, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 131, December, 2017: 61-91. 
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the notion of valency, which became the core concept of chemistry.  
What is important to appreciate is that for Schelling, this 
reconceptualization of physical existence was seen by him as necessary to 
account for the emergence and evolution of life, including consciousness and 
self-consciousness. He was arguing for a conception of the world as self-
organizing and evolving, and as ‘endophysicists’ are now arguing, that scientists 
are part of and within the world they are trying to understand. Karl Ernst von 
Baer and Charles Darwin were deeply indebted to this Schellingian tradition, 
as Robert Richards has pointed out.27 While Darwinism was formulated in an 
increasingly mechanist direction by mainstream biologists, a minority 
developed a holistic form of Darwinism that echoed and advanced Schelling’s 
understanding of evolution.28 This could incorporate von Uexküll’s argument 
that organisms can only be understood in the context of their Umwelten, their 
surrounding worlds, or environments as sensed by them. This tradition also 
inspired the notion of homeostasis and the notion of morphogenetic field in 
biology. Electro-magnetic fields and quantum field theory, integrated with 
thermodynamics (by Herbert Fröhlich), are now central to the development of 
biophysics, including neurophysics, in efforts to explain the emergence of 
consciousness.29 What ties all this together is the move from an ontology of 
things to an ontology of processes, the importance of which is being 
rediscovered again in the philosophy of biology.30 Brian Josephson has argued 
that the further development of Peircian biosemiotics is required to deal with 
the measurement problem in quantum theory.31 
Less noticed is that the most important developments in mathematics 
 
27 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, ch.14. 
28 See for instance Peter A. Corning, Holistic Darwinism, Synergy, Cybernetics, and the Bioeconomics of Evolution, 
Chicago: Uni. Of Chicago Press, 2005. 
29 See Giuseppe Vitiello, My Double Unveiled: The dissipative quantum model of brain. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 2001, Kuio Yasue, Mari Jibu and Tarcisio Della Senta eds. No Matter, Never Mind, Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins, 2001, and Gare, ‘Chreods, Homeorhesis and Biofields’. 
30 See Daniel J. Nicholson & John Dupré eds, Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 
31 Brian Josephson, ‘Biological Observer-Participation and Wheeler’s ‘Law without Law’, in Integral 
Biomathics: Tracing the Road to Reality’, ed. P.L. Simeonov, L.S. Smith, A.C. Ehresmann, Springer-Verlag, 
2012, pp.245-252. 
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underpinning modern science originated with the call by Schelling for a new 
mathematics adequate to a dynamic nature that includes life. This was prior to 
the development of catastrophe theory and complexity theory in the second 
half of the Twentieth Century, when again mathematics was called upon to 
develop mathematics adequate to life, beginning with the work of René Thom 
and then further developed at the Santa Fe Institute in their effort to model 
complex adaptive systems.32 The project was embraced originally by Justus 
Grassmann, who inspired the development of Hermann Grassmann’s 
extension theory in the mid-Nineteen Century, a geometric calculus serving as 
a universal instrument for geometric research, anticipating most of the 
mathematics utilized in modern physics.33 Category Theory can be seen as a 
further advance in Hermann Grassmann’s extension theory. As William 
Lawvere, a leading figure in the development of Category Theory, wrote: 
Looking more closely into Grassmann, Stephen Schanuel and I found numerous 
ways in which it could be justified to say that Grassmann was a pre-cursor of 
category theory. The general algebraic operations which he discussed have 
become the explicit object of a particular developed theory, and those general 
concepts, general operations, systems of operations and systems of equations in 
invariant coordinate free form have been made into a part of category theory.34  
As developed by Rosen and others, Category Theory has been a major 
advance in the quest inspired by Schelling to develop mathematics adequate to 
life. 
Peirce’s work, and biosemiotics, should be seen as advancing this whole 
project to conceive nature in such a way that knowledge of it, including 
predictions about the future, is possible, and that there are beings within nature 
 
32 Thom described this in Mathematical Models of Morphogenesis, trans. W.M. Brookes and D. Rand, 
Chichester: Ellis Horwood, 1983. Six chapters of this book were devoted to semantics, language and 
semiotics. On the work of the Santa Fe Institute, see George A. Cowan, David Pines and David Meltzer 
eds. Complexity: Metaphors, Models and Reality, Proceedings Volume XIX, Santa Fe Institute Studies in the 
Sciences of Complexity, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1994. 
33 Mircea Radu, “Justus Grassmann’s Contributions to the Foundations of Mathematics: Mathematical 
and Philosophical Aspects”, Historia Mathematica, 27 (2000): 4-35; and David Hestenes, ‘Grassmann’s 
Legacy’. In: Herman Grassman: From Past to Future: Grassman’s Work in Context, ed. Hans-Joachim Petsche, 
Basel: Springer, 2011, pp.240-260. 
34 Lawvere, F. William. ‘Grassmann’s Dialectics and Category Theory’, in Gert Schubring ed., Hermann 
Günther Grassmann (1809-1877): Visionary Mathematician, Scientist and Neohumanist Scholar, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1996, pp.255-264, p.256. 
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able to achieve this knowledge. The evolution of life, and then self-conscious 
life-forms capable of developing literature, philosophy and science, should then 
be able to be comprehended, so that life, through us, can be seen as advancing 
by comprehending itself and its place in a self-organizing, creative universe. 
This conception of nature should enable us to participate more effectively in 
not only comprehending but also creating the future.  
Peirce advanced this whole project by focussing first of all on the 
development of logic, conceived by him the core of science and the quest for 
knowledge, conceiving this as a form of semiosis, the production and 
interpretation of signs in a never ending process. Semiosis as conceived by 
Peirce involves a triadic relation between a sign, an object, and an interpretant, 
which then becomes another, possibly more developed sign, and Peirce also 
referred to this triadic relation itself as a sign. As such, semiosis can go on 
endlessly and creatively, generating increasing levels of complexity. Through 
understanding semiosis, Peirce argued, it becomes possible to not only 
understand all other domains of culture, including art and literature, but the 
emergence of self-hood, and beyond this, to grasp the nature of life itself, its 
origin and evolution, including the evolution of humanity.  
Problems in science have arisen because rather than carrying through this 
revolution in science, there has been a strong tendency to retain assumptions 
about what is science put in place by Cartesians and Newtonians, and this has 
stood in the way of appreciating how diverse advances in radical science, and 
also in natural philosophy, actually support each other.35 This is what I am 
attempting to show here by relating to each other Peirce’s and Rosen’s work in 
mathematics and theoretical biology. 
ROSEN’S THEORY OF MODELLING 
Robert Rosen was a major figure in the development of Category Theory. He 
was simultaneously a mathematician, a theoretical biologist, and although he 
did not claim to be such, a philosopher who, based on his work in mathematics 
and theoretical biology, utilized Category Theory to develop and defend new 
 
35 Stuart A. Kauffman and Arran Gare, ‘Beyond Descartes and Newton: Recovering life and humanity’, 
Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, Issue 119, December, 2015: 219-244. 
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conceptions of both mathematics and of science, and of the relationship 
between them. Category Theory originated in the work of Samuel Eilenberg 
and Saunders Mac Lane in algebraic topology. They introduced the concepts 
of categories, functors and natural transformations in order to understand the 
processes that preserve mathematical structure. Category Theory began with 
the observation that many properties of mathematical systems can be unified 
and simplified through a presentation with a diagram of arrows between 
‘objects’ (which can be sets, groups or rings, or can be unspecified), where each 
arrow represents a function. The most important property of these arrows is 
that they can be ‘composed’, that is, arranged in a sequence to form a new 
arrow. The focus is then not on ‘objects’, but on the structure preserving 
mappings or ‘morphisms’ between these ‘objects’. These mappings, which 
reveal the possible transformations of structures, can themselves be studied in 
this way. If the structures are themselves categories so that the morphisms 
revealing possible transformations are between categories, these are referred to 
as ‘functors’, and are represented as arrows between the categories. There can 
also be a category of functors. The morphisms that transform one functor into 
another while respecting the internal structure of the categories involved, 
thereby bringing into focus their mutability, are ‘natural transformations’. 
It was later shown that every branch of modern mathematics could be 
described in terms of categories, and doing so often yielded deep insights into 
and similarities between seemingly different areas of mathematics. For this 
reason, William Lawvere promoted Category Theory as an alternative to set 
theory as the foundation for mathematics, effectively, redefining mathematics 
in doing so. Rosen, who studied mathematics at the University of Chicago with 
Eilenberg and Mac Lane, argued that Category Theory is essentially modelling 
one branch of mathematics by another, and there is no essential difference 
between doing this and modelling the world beyond mathematics.36 In each 
case, what is being modelled is entailments. This was the basis of his general 
theory of modelling, and his characterization of science as modelling. He 
equated such models with analogical thinking.  
Category Theory as conceived by Rosen can then be interpreted as a major 
development of the Whiteheadian/Peircian conception of mathematics - as the 
 
36 Robert Rosen, ‘On Models and Modeling’, Applied Mathematics and Computation, 56, 1993: 359-372. 
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study through abstraction of possible patterns of connectedness and their 
transformations, utilizing diagrammatic reasoning.37 The modelling relation, 
where something is learned about one system by studying another which is 
analogous to it, is ubiquitous and characteristic of everyday life as well as of 
both theoretical and experimental science, Rosen argued.38 While offered as an 
aside, this characterization of modelling as analogical thinking is an extremely 
important argument, allowing Rosen’s conception of mathematical modelling 
to be understood through Peircian semiotics as offering potential interpretants 
based on iconic signs.  
All enquiry is concerned with systems of entailment, Rosen argued, causal 
entailment in the phenomenal world, inferential entailment in the 
mathematical. But inferential entailment in mathematics is really about 
entailment in the material world. That 3 sticks + 2 sticks = 5 sticks is a truth 
about the material world. Mathematics has always been concerned with 
discovering such entailments, and this is true in the present with efforts to 
understand chaos, turbulence and the emergence of new order. Mathematics 
goes profoundly astray when it dissociates itself from the world beyond 
mathematics, formalizing it by striving to provide the foundations for all 
mathematics in one very limited domain of mathematics, and then equating 
mathematical truths with what can be computed, as when the Pythagoreans 
attempted to reduce geometry to arithmetic on the assumption that any two 
line segments are commensurable, or Frege, Russell and Whitehead attempted 
to reduce arithmetic to symbolic logic and set theory. As Rosen argued, this 
ends up attempting to eliminate semantics, that is, what mathematics is about, 
and reduces mathematics to purely syntactic relations which can be specified 
purely formally. This was most fully manifest in Hilbert’s formalist program of 
achieving consistency in mathematics by reducing all mathematics to formally 
defined rules for the manipulation of meaningless symbols. The impossibility of 
this program was demonstrated by Gödel. As Rosen put it, ‘Mathematics, like 
 
37 Arran Gare, ‘Creating a New Mathematics’, Intuition in Mathematics and Physics, ed. Ronny Desmet, 
Anoka: Process Century Press, ch.7, pp.167-186. 
38 Robert Rosen, Anticipatory Systems: Philosophical, Mathematical, and Methodological Foundations, 1985. 2nd ed. 
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language itself, cannot be freed of all referents and remain mathematics.’39  
It is the failure to appreciate that mathematics is analogical reasoning and 
should be judged as such that has led to the belief that objectivity implies the 
use of models that are formalizable and thereby to the reduction of biology to 
chemistry and physics, and to forms of mathematics that make life itself 
unintelligible. As Rosen diagnosed source of this problem: 
[T]hese ideas [that every model of a material process must be formalizable] have 
become confused with objectivity and hence with the very fabric of the scientific 
enterprise. Objectivity is supposed to mean observer independence, and more 
generally, context independence. Over the course of time this has come to mean 
only building from the smaller to the larger, and reducing the larger to the 
smaller. … In any large world, such as the one we inhabit, this kind of 
identification is in fact a mutilation, and it serves only to estrange most of what is 
interesting from the realm of science itself.40  
Characterizing modelling through Category Theory did not mean that 
Rosen saw modelling as exclusively mathematical modelling. Rosen rejected 
the opposition noted by C.P. Snow between the two cultures: science and the 
humanities, or hard science and soft science.41 What the failure of formalism 
and other efforts to establish rigorous foundations for mathematics 
demonstrates is that models do not have the qualitative richness of what they 
attempt to model. Abstract models are taken to be ‘hard’ relative to that which 
is ‘soft’. On this basis, the axioms of logic and set theory are ‘hard’, relative to 
arithmetic which they model; arithmetic is ‘soft’. However, the same relation 
applies lower down. Quantitative models, that is arithmetical models, appear to 
be ‘hard’ relative to qualitative mathematics. In each case, what is deemed to 
be ‘soft’ captures more of the richness of reality than what is deemed to be 
‘hard’. 
Although Rosen did not make this argument, it should be seen that 
qualitative mathematics appears to be hard relative to stories, and structuralist 
analyses of stories appear to be hard relative to the diversity of actual and 
potential stories. So, in defending new forms of mathematics in order to do 
 
39 Rosen, Life Itself, p.8. 
40 Rosen, Essays on Life Itself, 2000, p.80. 
41 Robert Rosen, Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of Life, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991,  p.1ff. 
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justice to the reality of life through his interpretation of modelling through 
Category Theory, Rosen was led to reject the identification of science with 
what can be known through mathematics, even a mathematics liberated from 
earlier assumptions that had rendered it incapable of acknowledging the reality 
of life. It is necessary to develop new non-mathematical models based on 
semiosis, as Kalevi Kull called for.42 It is also necessary to recognize the more 
fundamental representative capacity of stories. Stuart Kauffman argued in 
‘Emergence and Story: Beyond Newton, Einstein and Bohr’ that all 
mathematics is limited by its quest to pre-state the configuration space of all 
possibilities, and this is impossible. There will always new or adjacent possibles 
coming into existence with the evolution of the universe, and this creative 
dimension of reality cannot be modelled through mathematics.43 Rosen’s 
arguments against formalism provide support for Kauffman’s arguments. As 
Anton Markoš et al. noted in an essay on biosemiotics, stories are ‘based on 
events, unique chances, irreversible decisions, individual cases and occurrences 
of “once and never more” type.’ 44 
ROSENNIAN ANTICIPATORY SYSTEMS AND PEIRCIAN PHILOSOPHY 
Rosen did not defend stories, or semiotics; his interest was in freeing 
mathematics and science from strictures deriving ultimately from Newtonian 
science that had elevated an impoverished surrogate universe of excessively 
abstract notions as the basis for characterizing the whole of reality. The only 
entailment allowed by Newtonian science is a recursive rule governing state 
succession. Causation (if one can call it that) is collapsed down to what can be 
encoded in a state transition sequence, as this is all the Newtonian language 
allows to be decoded back into causal language. Further strictures follow from 
the assumption that the universe is composed of structureless particles and that 
every system has a largest model from which every other model can be 
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effectively abstracted by purely formal means. This, he argued, has tended to 
cripple the advance of science, and most importantly, has made it impossible 
for science to comprehend life itself by denying the reality of final causes. He 
argued that the focus of biology should be on organization, not on the material 
components. Organization includes relations between material parts, relations 
between the effects of interactions of the material parts, and relations with the 
organism’s ambience or environment and, very importantly, with time or 
temporal processes and possibilities associated with these unrepresentable in 
purely spatial terms. This is the condition for giving a place to final causes.  
Recognizing a place for final causes, Rosen set out to model anticipatory 
systems, systems which do not simply react to their environments but anticipate 
and respond to what will happen in the future through a predictive model. He 
argued ‘that an anticipatory behaviour is one in which a change of state in the 
present occurs as a function of some predicted future state, and that the agency 
through which the prediction is made must be, in the broadest sense, a 
model.’45 A system capable of such behaviour is an anticipatory system. Rosen 
defined an anticipatory system as ‘a system containing a predictive model of 
itself and/or of its environment, which allows it to change state at an instant in 
accord with the model’s predictions pertaining to a later instant.’46 Modelling 
anticipatory systems involves modelling systems that produce and repair their 
own components (in accordance with how Kant and Schelling understood 
living organisms), and to do so, have models of themselves and their 
environments (as von Neumann argued), and these models must also be 
modelled.  
Such systems, Rosen showed, can be represented through synthetic models 
in which functional components are the direct product of the system.47 In these 
models the components are context dependent, and cannot be reduced to 
 
45 Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, p.8. 
46 See Rosen, Anticipatory Systems, p.313. 
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fractional parts conceivable independently of the models. Such systems are 
complex, but not as mainstream complexity theory understands complexity. 
Genuinely complex systems, Rosen argued, require multiple formal 
descriptions which are not derivable from each other, but presuppose each 
other, to capture all their properties. The example Rosen produced to illustrate 
this was his metabolism, repair, reproduction models (the M-R systems). These 
models consist of three algebraic maps, one of which represents the efficient 
cause of metabolism in a cell, another, the efficient cause of repair (that repairs 
damage to the metabolic processes), and the third represents replication which 
repairs damage to the repair process.48 Each of these maps has one of the other 
two as a member of its co-domain, and is itself a member of the co-domain of 
the remaining map. The maps thus form a loop of mutual containment, and it 
is in relation to this system as a whole that it is then possible to identify 
functions. As Rosen put it: ‘a material system is an organism if, and only if, it is closed to 
efficient causation. That is, if ƒ is any component of such a system, the question 
“why ƒ” has an answer within the system, which corresponds to the category of 
efficient cause of ƒ.’49 Such models require the use of circular definitions or 
‘impredicativities’ associated with sets which are members of themselves. In the 
past such definitions have been taken as defects to be eliminated from rigorous 
thinking in logic, mathematics and science, as in Bertrand Russell’s theory of 
types as the solution to Russell’s Paradox concerning the status of the set of all 
sets that are not members of themselves. On the basis of such models it is 
possible to appreciate the ability of complex systems to incorporate models of 
themselves in their environments into their behaviour, anticipating future 
events and correcting their behaviour as new information sheds light on the 
anticipatory process.50 
Rosen’s work concurs with Peirce’s philosophy and biosemiotics in a 
number of ways. Viewing mathematics through Category Theory, especially as 
interpreted by Rosen, supports Peirce’s claim that mathematics is essentially 
diagrammatic reasoning, and that it is about relations. His argument that 
mathematics cannot be reduced to syntactical relations but must have a 
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semantic aspect, that is, reference in some sense to ‘objects’ that are being 
modelled, conforms to Peirce’s notion of semiosis as involving triadic relations 
between signs, objects and interpretants. That is, it enables mathematics itself 
to be understood through Peirce’s notion of semiosis, and is more ‘Peircian’ 
than Peirce’s characterization of mathematics as the science that draws 
necessary consequences from purely hypothetical states of things.  
In the case of an anticipatory system, the system must have a model of itself 
in its relation to its environment with the model differentiating the organism 
from its ambience and defining this ambiance as the external world in terms of 
itself.51 This model must be included in the model of this system. This accords 
with von Uexküll’s notion of Umwelt constituted and delimited by ‘functional 
circles’ and biosemioticians’ interpretation of this through Peircian semiotics, as 
Kalevi Kull and Howard Pattee have noted, 52 with the model being a sign or 
complex of signs in Peirce’s sense.53 In both Rosen’s notion of modelling 
involving models and in Peirce’s notion of signs defined through signs, there is 
self-reference, involving circular definitions or impredicativities. Such self-
reference involves relations to relations, and both Rosen and Peirce upheld 
relational realism, in which physical reality is held to be essentially relational. 
On this view, relations have equivalent ontological status to what in the past 
had been regarded as totally sub-subsistent individuals, while individuals are 
now regarded as only existing through their relations.54 
Most importantly, and on the basis of such relational realism, Rosen 
defended the reality of immanent final causes. And as Lucia Santaella Braga 
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has shown, Peircian semiosis presupposes final causation.55 The reality of final 
causes in nature has been denied in the past by those taking mathematical 
physics based on Newtonian assumptions as the model for all science and 
identifying real science with the use of traditional mathematical models of 
reality. Other than diehard followers of Peirce, few people have accepted his 
effort to characterize the fundamental laws of nature as the product of habits in 
a way that implies a telos, and Peirce himself appears to have abandoned this 
view, if he ever held it, writing that ‘it is unnecessary to suppose that habit 
taking is a primordial principle of the universe.’56 Very few biologists took 
Jakob von Uexküll’s defence of final causes based on his vitalism seriously. By 
advancing mathematics to be able to give a place to final causes, Rosen 
countered effectively what had become and still is a dogma.  
ROSEN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND CAUSATION 
However, it is not this that is most important for this argument since the 
argument does not involve equating science with the deployment of 
mathematics. What is more important for defending the scientific credentials of 
Peircian biosemiotics is Rosen’s characterisation of the role of mathematics in 
science and work on causation and what is involved in modelling it, and 
through this work, his characterization of science. 
The main goal of the logical positivists had been to define what is genuine 
science, and taking their model from physics their conclusion that science is 
essentially about making verifiable predictions using mathematics, associated 
with the deductive-nomological model of explanation, was largely based on the 
characterization of mathematics by Frege, Bertrand Russell and the early 
Ludwig Wittgenstein.57 In assuming the goal of science is theory reduction, in 
which all particular theories would eventually be deducible from more general 
theories, they were implicitly committed beyond this epistemological 
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reductionism to strong ontological reductionism, that all phenomena should be 
explained completely through physics, treating mathematics as a means for 
making measurable predictions or identifying reality with mathematical 
structures. This not only eliminated formal and final causes, but as Russell had 
already pointed out, efficient and material causes, and along with these, any 
place for agency or consciousness.58 This characterization of genuine science 
was not really challenged by the early work of Karl Popper who argued that 
propositions are only scientific if they can be falsified through falsifiable 
predictions rather than be verified.   
It was pointed out that logical positivism was logically incoherent because 
its foundational assumption, that only verified observational statements or 
logically valid deductions have any claim to providing knowledge cannot be 
verified either observationally or by logical deduction, and therefore cannot be 
defended by logical positivists. However, what really eliminated logical 
positivism from being taken seriously in the philosophy of science was that 
historians of science were able to show that the logical positivist’s 
characterization of what science is and how it develops does not accord with 
real science. What they showed was that far from science being opposed to 
metaphysics, as Peirce argued, science is always based on metaphysics, either 
unexamined or critically examined. ‘Find a scientific man who proposes to get 
along without metaphysics’ Peirce wrote, ‘and you have found one whose 
doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics 
with which they are packed’ (CP: 1-129).  
The demolition of logical positivism by historically oriented philosophers of 
science such as Ernst Cassirer, Alexander Koyré, Gaston Bachelard, Norwood 
Russell Hanson (who was strongly influenced by Peirce), Stephen Toulmin, 
Thomas Kuhn, Dudley Shapere, Imré Lakatos, Gerd Buchdahl and Paul 
Feyerabend, characterized by Nick Jardine as ‘Kantians on wheels’,59 revived 
Kant’s insight that observations presuppose questions that are formulated in 
terms of conceptual frameworks and focussed attention on the creation and 
evolution of concepts, in the case of Lakatos in Proofs and Refutations, on 
 
58 Bertrand Russell, ‘On the Notion of Cause’, Mysticism and Logic, Unwin: London, 1917, ch.9. 
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mathematical concepts, challenging the focus by philosophers of mathematics 
on the axiomatization of mathematics.60 In so doing, Hanson revived and 
accorded a central place to Peirce’s notion of abduction, Kuhn introduced 
along with his famous distinction between normal and evolutionary science, the 
notion of ‘ exemplars’, exemplary achievements which define good science,61 
and Lakatos introduced the notion of research programs based on commitment 
to hard-cores, basic ideas that subsequently are placed beyond questioning and 
assumed in research. Research programs are progressive when they lead to new 
questions, insights and predictions, and degenerating when they merely re-
describe the achievements of other research programs. However, Feyerabend 
pointed out that research programs deemed to be stagnant can prove 
themselves in the long run.  
These philosophers of science also challenged the logical positivists’ 
characterization of the goal of science, arguing that it is comprehension or 
understanding rather than just making predictions. This demolition of logical 
positivism also demolished the defence of strong reductionism, the idea that 
science progresses by showing how more specific theories can be deduced from 
more general theories, ultimately from theories in physics, the form of 
reductionism Rosen was really arguing against. The main problem engendered 
by these anti-logical positivist philosophers was that in defending constructivism 
they tended to relativism, with Feyerabend explicitly defending a form of 
relativism (although this was not genuine relativism).  
This relativism was challenged by Alasdair MacIntyre who argued that 
major advances in science could be judged as such through the historical 
narratives they made possible of past science, accounting for its achievements 
but also revealing why it failed, and why its failures could not be solved without 
a radical break with the assumptions of this earlier science.62 Relativism also led 
to a revival of efforts to defend realism of various kinds, the most important of 
which involved giving a place to models in science and/or privileging causal 
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explanations as the defining features of science and required to achieve 
comprehension or understanding.63 The later Karl Popper, defending the 
reality of propensities in nature, could be included here.64 Mary Hesse reviving 
ideas on modelling from R.N. Campbell published in 1920,65 Nancy Cartwright 
focussing on the capacities of nature, modelling and defending ‘experimental 
realism’,66 Richard Boyd defending the role of metaphors and arguing for real 
causes, and Rom Harré defending the reality of causal powers and liabilities 
while also claiming a central role for analogies and models in science, have 
been leading figures in this development. Harré argued for the identification of 
the powers and liabilities of kinds of beings, and explanations through these 
analogies and models, as a defining feature of genuine science. He is 
particularly important because, along with defending realism, the role of 
modelling and causal explanations, he argued for emergent powers and 
liabilities, making significant contributions to post-reductionist science. His 
work was part of a revival of natural philosophy. As an opponent of the 
reductionism of the logical positivists, he strongly influenced psychology while 
influencing theoretical biologists such as Brian Goodwin.67 Roy Bhaskar, a 
strong defender or realism and opponent of reductionism in social theory and 
the human sciences who inspired the critical realists, had been his student.  
Harré defended the importance of metaphysics to science and aligned 
himself with Boscovich’s dynamism. He argued the major task of science is to 
identify the powers and liabilities of natural kinds of being, including their 
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powers to maintain themselves in existence.68 These in turn were to be 
explained through generative mechanisms understood in terms of the powers 
and liabilities of other kinds of beings while still recognizing the emergent 
powers and liabilities of what is being explained.69 In making this argument, 
Harré defended the notion of natural necessity. Recognizing natural kinds and 
natural necessity accords with Peirce’s argument against nominalism that we 
must accept the reality of universals in each object being studied for science to 
be possible, the condition for recognizing the reality of relations and relations 
between relations, including possible relations. This new characterization of 
science, giving a privileged place to causation, led to a focus by philosophers of 
science on the nature of causation and causality. Bhaskar defended 
‘transcendental realism’, claiming to be able to make claims about physical 
existence and causation associated with it on the grounds that these are the 
conditions for their being scientific explanations.70 Effectively, this was a revival 
of Schelling’s effort to ‘naturalize the transcendental’, without the dialectical 
dimension developed by Schelling under the influence of Fichte. Later, Bhaskar 
embraced and defended a form of dialectics. 
Rosen characterized science as the quest to provide models of causal 
entailment, and this view can be seen in relation to these philosophers of 
science as a further advance in the philosophy of science, at the same time, 
recovering and advancing the earlier work on this by Schelling and then Peirce. 
Neither Hesse, Cartwright, Boyd, Harré nor Bhaskar offered a characterization 
of what is mathematics along with their characterization of causation and 
modelling, let alone explain its success and its limits in science. Nor have they 
explained the possibility of final causation emerging in nature where previously 
it did not exist. All this was provided by Rosen, who in doing so was also 
advancing a theory of modelling.71 
It is in the context of these developments in the philosophy of science that 
the re-examination of Peirce’s work on causation, and beyond that, Schelling’s 
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work on causation should be seen of as of major importance. In particular, the 
importance of Schelling’s prioritizing the notion of ‘community of causation’ 
introduced by Kant in the second edition of the Critique of  Pure Reason over 
cause effect relations, which Schelling argued were abstractions from this 
community of causation, should be appreciated. Schelling then characterized 
causation within this community of causation as ‘self-limiting’ of activity, 
effectively prioritizing immanent causation. As Schelling put it, ‘The chief 
problem of the philosophy of nature is not to explain the active in Nature (for, 
because it is its first supposition, this is quite conceivable to it), but the resting, 
permanent. Philosophy of Nature arrives at this explanation simply by virtue of 
the presupposition that for Nature the permanent is a limitation of its own 
activity.’72  While Peirce offered an acute analysis and critique of received views 
of causation, pointing out the confusion between Aristotelian and post-
Newtonian notions of causation, and offered definitions of efficient causation 
and final causation73, it is also evident that he had not revived Schelling’s 
notion of immanent causation. Existents are briefly mentioned by Peirce as 
‘entities’ associated with ‘the germ of a law’, seen as emerging in nature 
through chance.74 (Peirce, 1992: 210). This is the origin of those parts of nature 
which, through taking on habits, have become predictable and so can be 
characterized by generals. But Peirce offered only brief suggestions about the 
general characteristics of these existents, despite acknowledging the importance 
of individuation and claiming that defining such characteristics is a major task 
of metaphysics. While he aligned himself with dynamism (defending Boscovich) 
and argued for the reality of dynamic atoms, suggested that matter might 
‘consist of vortices in a fluid which itself consists of far minuter solids, these, 
however, being themselves vortices of a fluid, itself consisting of ultimate solids, 
and so on in endless alternation’,75 gave a place to points and instants, 
mentioned objects of various kinds, referred to possibles, occurrences and 
collectives, molecules, organisms, minds and communities, no general claims 
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were made about existents as such or any consideration given to how existents 
sustain themselves in existence. Their endurance was accounted for as the 
habits of nature, rather than the immanent causation of existents themselves as 
self-limiting activities as in Schelling. 
The absence of interest in immanent causation accounts for Peirce’s 
concomitant lack of interest in the endurance of existents in nature, either in a 
static form generated by a balance of opposing forces, as with crystals, or 
actively, in the case of organisms which do not have such a balance and must 
continually exchange matter with their environments to maintain a balance 
and, as Schelling argued following Kant, are always actively engaged in 
maintaining (and developing) their forms. Consequently, Peirce could suggest 
that ‘all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of 
signs’,76 failing to draw a distinction between the signs of death of an organism 
and its death. Peircian biosemioticians, who almost universally have integrated 
Peirce’s ideas on semiotics with systems theory, Gregory Bateson’s 
bioanthropology77 and later, Maturana and Varela’s notion of autopoiesis 
(bringing their ideas closer to Schelling), have ignored this gap in Peirce’s work. 
CAUSATION AS CONSTRAINT 
For biosemioticians, the most significant work on causation or causality, 
although it has not always been characterized as such, has been Howard 
Pattee’s notion of enabling constraints, a notion that echoes without being 
influenced by Schelling’s notion of ‘limiting’ of activity (which is likely to have 
been influenced by Anaximander’s conception of the cosmos as evolving 
through the limiting of the unlimited). In the context of dealing with the 
measurement problem in quantum theory, Pattee took up the notion of 
constraints from Michael Polanyi and argued that it is the peculiar constraints 
associated with making measurements that transform matter into symbols.78 
Such measurement cannot be explained in terms of laws of physics and 
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involves an epistemic cut whereby constraints are put in place in order to make 
measurements. He generalized the notion of such constraints to characterize 
what is involved in all hierarchical order, arguing that new constraints could be 
enabling, creating new possibilities. The higher orders with their new 
possibilities exist in the process of constraining the lower orders and cannot be 
understood in terms of the lower orders. As Polanyi pointed out, it is impossible 
to understand a machine through the study of the chemistry of its components; 
there is a different level of ordering involved in the organization of the 
machine. It is by conceiving causation or causality through constraining that 
downward causation can be made comprehensible.79 Pattee argued that with 
life, such downward causation takes an unusual form. While the constraints in 
the hierarchical order in atoms, molecules, crystals, mountains and stars are 
based on forces generated by their configuration, in living organisms, ‘the 
upper level exerts a specific, dynamic constraint on the details of the motion at 
lower levels, so that the fast dynamics of the lower level cannot simply be 
averaged out.’80 These are ‘non-holonomic’ constraints. 
The notion of hierarchical order through constraints was taken up by a 
number of theorists, including Tim Allen, Stan Salthe and Alicia Juaerro. 
Salthe argued that emergence, in both development and evolution, is 
associated with interpolation of new constraints between processes of shorter 
and longer scales and faster and slower rate processes, modifying both the 
longer and the shorter scale processes. Granting a place to scalar hierarchies 
was then used to characterize and explain final causes. As Salthe observed: 
‘constraints from the higher level not only help to select the lower level-
trajectory but also pull it into its future at the same time. Top-down causality is 
a form of final causality.’81 He argued that the ultimate final cause is to 
transform negative entropy into entropy. Building on this work, Juaerro 
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explicitly argued that all causation is constraining.82  
Effectively, this notion of causation as constraining was a rediscovery of 
Schelling’s characterization of causation as limiting of activity generating 
individuals which, like eddies in a stream, are to some extent self-causing, with 
living individuals asserting themselves against their environments and 
exchanging material with their environments, actively maintaining their forms, 
being both cause and effect of themselves, and in so doing, defining their 
environments as their worlds. As Schelling put it, ‘[t]he organism has an 
external world because there is an original duplicity within it’ while ‘[d]ead 
matter has no external world, it is absolutely identical and homogeneous with 
the whole whose part it is.’83 This notion of “world” clearly anticipates the 
notion of Umwelt developed by Jakob von Uexküll. 
While Pattee himself found the work of the biosemioticians problematic,84 
Salthe who first used this notion of constraints to link Pattee’s work with that of 
the Peirican biosemioticians continues to defend their work.85 The notion of 
causation as constraining was also deployed by the biosemiotican Terrence 
Deacon in Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter.86 Such explanations 
did not satisfy Barbieri. Salthe was one of the targets of Barbieri’s critique of 
biosemiotics. 
Early in his career, Rosen worked with Pattee, and also characterized 
causation as constraining. Pattee wrote a long critical review of Rosen’s later 
work, tracing the development of his more critical attitude to mainstream 
science.87 He suggested that Rosen’s greater interest in formalism led him in a 
more idealist direction, which led him to ignore the physical basis of life, 
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ignoring the work they had done together. Given the place Rosen granted to 
causation, however, this characterization is questionable. What does seem to 
have occurred is that Rosen came to the conclusion that it was a mistake to 
make biology subservient to physics. As he argued in a Festschrift for David 
Bohm: ‘In every confrontation between universal physics and special biology, it 
is physics which has always had to give ground.’88 Rosen never abandoned the 
notion of causation as constraint, and he continued to defend the notion of 
anticipatory systems. In 1988 he published an essay ‘Constraints and the Origin 
of Life’,89 defending the role of constraints after having published his book 
Anticipatory Systems in 1985, and defended the notion of anticipatory systems in 
his Essays on Life Itself  after having published Life Itself  in 1991.90 However, 
Rosen did show a lack of interesting in ‘material’ causes as these had been 
characterized by Aristotle, and I will suggest later that this could be grounds for 
complaint. 
Seen as building on his work on constraints, Rosen’s later work can be seen 
as dealing with multiple, co-extensive processes operating on much the same 
scale and so are not simply in hierarchical order. They are components of each 
other while not being reducible to each other, constraining each other while 
being the conditions for each other. That is, it is a heterarchical order, a notion 
that has been developed by Y.P. Gungi, K. Sasia and S. Wakisaka in a way that 
accords with and further supports Rosen’s work.91 The hard core of Rosen’s 
research program (in Lakatos’ sense) that led him to this conclusion was the 
argument of John von Neumann that living beings must have models of 
themselves, together with the view that the goal of science is successful 
modelling and that therefore it is necessary in modelling life to model systems 
that have models of themselves. Recognizing the need to model processes that 
are components of each other but not reducible to each other, in such a way 
that this is sustains and is organized through a model of itself, is associated with 
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a complex temporality of becoming incomprehensible through mechanistic 
explanations. Rosen defined a natural system as mechanical if it possesses the 
following properties: ‘(1) it has a largest model, consisting of a set of states, and 
a recursion rule entailing subsequent state from present state; and (2) every 
other state of it can be obtained from the largest one by formal means.’ Natural 
law, as it came to be redefined on the basis of these assumptions by Newton 
and as it is still understood ‘boils down to the assertion that every natural system is 
a mechanism.’92 Living beings cannot be modelled through a largest model. 
While questioning Rosen’s characterization of reductionism as mechanistic, my 
contention is that it is acknowledging this complexity with this more complex 
notion of causality that makes intelligible semiosis as it was characterized by 
Peirce and deployed by Peircian biosemioticians.  
Attempting to defend this through Rosen’s modelling of anticipatory 
systems is problematic in one respect; Rosen clearly regarded his work as 
unfinished. He intended to write a book on ontology completing his work on 
his theory of life itself, but he died before writing this. I have argued elsewhere 
and suggested earlier that this ontology would have been a form of process 
metaphysics giving a place to processes that are essentially relational and not 
only in hierarchical order, but can also be heterarchical, co-extensive and co-
durational components of each other.93 That is what his models were 
modelling.  
INTERPRETING PEIRCIAN BIOSEMIOTICS THROUGH ROSEN’S 
NOTION OF CAUSATION 
It is this notion of complexity that is required to model the causation associated 
with semiosis as conceived by Peirce. Although Peirce referred to efficient and 
final causes when discussing semiosis and grappled with the nature of 
causation, he did not offer a causal analysis of semiosis, although he frequently 
referred to causation in the context of discussing semiosis. Menno Hulswit in 
the one major study of Peirce’s work on causation and causality pointed out 
that the reason for this lack was that Peirce followed Comte and took 
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mathematics, which included logic (which he characterized as semiosis), as the 
most abstract and therefore the ultimate science, above metaphysics and the 
natural sciences, providing the foundations for them, and therefore not 
explicable through the categories of metaphysics or explicable through the 
natural sciences.94 If this is the case, I am suggesting that Comte’s hierarchical 
organization of knowledge should be rejected for Schelling’s (and Hegel’s) 
conception of the organization of knowledge as circular, in which the premises 
have to be defended by the conclusion or conclusions developed on the basis of 
these premises.  
Peirce’s starting point, building on the work of Kant and Schelling but 
utilizing the new developments in symbolic logic, was in characterizing the 
logic of science. To achieve this, he characterized logic as semiosis and 
characterized semiosis so that the highly developed signs associated with 
science could be seen to have evolved from more basic signs and more 
primitive forms of semiosis. In 1907 Peirce offered his most general definition of 
a sign as that which ‘mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is 
both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the 
interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be 
determined by the object through the mediation of the “sign”’.95 He also 
suggested that what is communicated is a form, or as he put it:  
That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the 
Interpretant is a Form; that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, 
is the fact that something would happen under certain conditions. …. In the Sign 
it is embodied only in a representative sense, meaning that whether by virtue of 
some real modification of the Sign, or otherwise, the Sign becomes endowed with 
the power of communicating it to an interpretant.’96 
It is important to emphasize here ‘this tri-relative influence’, based on Peirce’s 
fundamental categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, is not ‘in any 
way resolvable into actions between pairs’.97 Peirce argued that it is this triadic 
relation associated with signs that characterizes life, and it is only in terms of 
the origin of this triadic relation that the origin of life can be explained. As he 
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argued,  
[T]he problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world is a 
better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life first came 
about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that of pure chance, 
which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure 
chance may itself be a vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the physiological 
sense would be due to life in the metaphysical sense.98 
Integrated with Jakob von Uexküll’s claim that living organisms have an Umwelt 
and cannot be fully understood unless this tri-relative influence is 
acknowledged, is the hard core of the Peircian biosemiotics research program, 
underpinned by Peirce’s metaphysics.  
Elsewhere Peirce refers to a sign as ‘representamen’, a ‘representation’ or a 
‘ground,’ and some Peircians now refer to it as a ‘sign vehicle’ to clarify that for 
Peirce, it is only some element of this which enables it to signify. The term 
‘interpretant’, which functions as another sign, implies there is some kind of 
comprehension (implying ‘grasping’, mental or otherwise) involved. Peirce’s 
identification and classification of ten different sign types has been brilliantly 
explicated by Torkild Thellefsen, utilizing Peirce’s basic categories to show how 
all these signs are related to each other, with the signs of culture presupposing 
and being based on the more primitive signs that humans have in common 
with animals and plants. However, what this study reveals is the need to revise 
these if they are to be applicable to elementary forms of life.99 For instance, the 
most basic sign of all, a ‘Qualisign’ as Firstness of Firstness as a mere quality, 
cannot be the bare experience of a colour, but could be a discernible difference, 
or more fundamentally, a felt attunement or discordance associated with 
resonance or absence of it, which might equate to the feelings of ‘yum’ or ‘yuk’. 
As noted, Hulswit interpreted Peirce as believing that while it is possible to 
characterize this causal process through semiosis, he did not believe that 
semiosis requires a causal explanation. It is not possible to treat semiosis as one 
or more dyadic causal relations, either between a substance (i.e. agent) and its 
effects, or between events. For instance, Peirce would not accept that if an 
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event A causes event B and event B causes event C, then C is the interpretant 
of ‘sign’ B with respect to ‘object’ A. This is just a sequence of dyadic relations. 
Nor would he accept that semiosis occurs when the initial state of a system 
results in a final state, since the final state simply replaces the initial state. For 
Peirce, the final state has to retain its relation to the initial state. It is for this 
reason that, as David Lidov put it, ‘Peirce pictures signs in the mind as 
overlapping like fields or waves.’100 Hulswit concluded from this: ‘Object, sign, 
and interpretant cannot be causally related one to another, because together 
they constitute what it is to be a sign. Since semiosis is irreducibly triadic, its 
elements cannot, qua semiosis, be causally related.’101 While Peirce did refer to 
causes, Hulswit argued he really thought in terms of causation or durational 
causal processes as defended by philosophers such as C.D. Broad and Alfred 
North Whitehead and (later elaborated and defended in more detail by 
Dorothy Emmet),102 rather than cause effect relations.103 A durational causal 
process, rather than being merely a sequence of events, involves ‘complexity, 
teleology, and coherence.’104 In this, semiosis provides the formal structure of 
causation, but Hulswit does not show how causality can generate complexity, 
teleology and coherence, although in a later work he pointed out that Peirce 
although never explicitly formulated a theory of causation, was offering an 
.ingenious middle way between Aristotelian and the modern scientific concept 
of causation.105 
While Hulswit is certainly right in claiming that Peirce believed that it is 
impossible to give a causal account of semioisis in terms of dyadic cause-effect 
relations, Peirce does refer to Dynamical Objects determining the significant 
character of a sign.106 As he argued ‘we have to distinguish the Immediate 
Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is 
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thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical 
Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the 
Sign to its Representation.’ 107 Dynamical Objects were further characterized as 
that which Dynamical or Objective science can investigate.108 They are 
presupposed by Immediate Objects (perceived, imagined or thought about), 
but can only be indicated by a hint or by being indicated, leaving the 
interpreter to find them by ‘collateral experience’.109 Peirce also characterizes a 
sign as a power of communicating a form to its interpretant, that is, as a formal 
cause. 110  While the notion of causation as used here might appear problematic, 
it is clearly important to Peirce, and it does need to be examined. The formal 
structure of causation in semiosis needs to be investigated and characterized.   
The problem in achieving this is the inadequacy or lack of development of 
Peirce’s characterization of causation (or causality). After criticising received 
views about causation, pointing out the confusion due to the failure to properly 
appreciate the radical difference between and then confusing Aristotle’s and 
Newton’s understanding of causation, Peirce suggested there are three forms of 
causation whereby events come to pass: external compulsion, inward nature 
and irregularity.111 Later, reworking Aristotle’s doctrine of four causes, Peirce 
divided causes according to whether they were defining or individuating, and 
whether they were internal or external. He characterized efficient cause as the 
individuating external cause and the final cause as the defining external cause, 
and the formal cause or form as the defining internal cause and the material 
cause as the individuating internal cause. Peirce held these internal causes to be 
part of what is caused.112 ‘Internal cause’ appeared to correspond to what 
earlier he had referred to as ‘inward nature’. However, Peirce had little to say 
on these internal causes. It appears that Peirce lacked the notion of ‘self-
organization’, or dealt with it as only self-reinforcing habits.  
My claim is that such internal causes understood as immanent causation 
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can be understood through Rosen’s characterization of causation. Rosen’s 
understanding of causation as entailment built on the notion of causation as 
constraining, thereby giving a place to downward causation, offered a 
conception of the world in which along with hierarchically ordered processes 
there are also heterarchically ordered co-becoming processes irreducible to 
each other while being components of each other. Such complex processes and 
the causation associated with these can anticipate the future, constraining 
activity in the present to respond to what is anticipated rather than simply 
reacting to what is in the present. While semiosis can be explained as a special 
kind of causality, it is only through the highest form of semiosis involving 
symbols, including developments in mathematics, that such causality can be 
comprehended; that is, that nature though us can comprehend itself to this 
extent. 
To begin with, as I have argued, Rosen accepted Pattee, Salthe and 
Juarrero’s conception of causation as constraining and thereby capable of 
forming emergent hierarchies. However, beyond this, Rosen allowed a place 
for heterarchical causality associated with processes of a system being 
components of each other but irreducible to each other, constraining by 
continuously modulating each other in accordance with a model predicting 
future states. As noted, Rosen was pre-eminently concerned to model systems 
that have models of themselves. The model, which is, as Rosen put it, the 
agency through which the prediction is made, and so is the equivalent of a 
Peircian sign. What is involved in life as modelled by Rosen is a complex triadic 
causality in which there is an entanglement of metabolic processes and 
regulating processes, differentiating and maintaining the system from its 
ambient environment, generating a model of itself as an essential part of this, 
anticipating thereby its own future possibilities within its ambience and 
reflexively regulating this whole process to realize possibilities. As an 
anticipatory system it maintains its metabolism and repairs itself and the repair 
process in this way and in doing so, reproduces the model of itself. This 
exemplifies the triadic nature of semiosis as it was characterized by Peirce, with 
the model being a sign of the living system and its ambience and the realized 
possibility or possibilities, which includes the model, being the interpretant. As 
such the model functions again as a sign, although represented mathematically 
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there can be no place for creativity of the interpretant in response to 
unanticipated possibilities. Nevertheless, Rosen’s characterization of this shows 
how signs can emerge, and with the emergence of signs, this process opens up a 
new dimension of not just individual signs and their interpretants, but of sign 
relationships. Ultimately, as Karl-Otto Apel put it in his exposition of Peirce’s 
philosophy, the triadicity of semiosis opens up ‘the entire field of intersubjective 
communicative understanding.’113 This triadic causality, I claim, in accounting 
for Peircian semiosis, is the missing dimension that in conjunction with 
hierarchy theory can account for the emergence and evolution of life, including 
the evolution of humanity, human cultures, philosophy, mathematics and 
science.  
What Rosen added to the hierarchy theorists’ conception of life through his 
conception of processes co-existing as components of each other but not 
reducible to each other, was self-reference in which, as Eliseo Fernández put it, 
‘relata relate to themselves through their partial relations to other relata.’114 
While Salthe showed one of the conditions for final causes, that is, downward 
causation through emergent constraints, his characterization of the inexorable 
tendency to degrade energy gradients as the telos of life misses something, just 
as does treating end-points modelled in mathematics as attractors as final 
causes. Rosen introduces into the picture some primordial interest by the living 
organism through this self-reference in maintaining and developing its own 
organization against the tendencies within its environment or ‘ambience’ to 
eliminate it, anticipating the future in relation to itself, enabling it to utilize its 
present environment for its own ends; that is, to maintain and impose its form 
and reproduce itself. This accords with the conception of life defended by the 
philosophical biologist Hans Jonas.115 
This is a stronger and more adequate notion of final cause than provided by 
Salthe. As Stuart Kauffman pointed out, self-reference in relation to the future 
is the condition for the organism to ‘manipulate the world on their own behalf.’ 
 
113 Karl-Otto Apel, Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism, trans. John Michael Krois, New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1995, p.129. 
114 Eliseo Fernández, ‘Taking the Relational Turn: Biosemiotics and Some New Trends in Biology’, 
Biosemtiotics, 3, 2010: 147-156, p.154. 
115 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, Chicago: Uni. of Chicago Press, 1966, 
Fourth Essay and Fifth Essay. 
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Kauffman argued ‘semantics enters the universe as the agents coevolve and 
behave on their own behalf with one another in the unfolding of the 
biosphere.’116 This self-interest is manifest in organisms distinguishing ‘yum’ 
from ‘yuk’ and responding accordingly, Kauffman argued. He noted that with 
‘yuk and yum, we are not far from C.S. Peirce’s meaning laden semiotic 
triad’.117 While the language is slightly different, with Rosen referring to this 
self-reference as the organism’s model of itself in its environment, Rosen’s 
characterization of life concurs with that developed by the biosemioticians. By 
adding  the extra dimension to the notion of causation as constraining to give a 
place to self-reference and thereby a more adequate account of final causes he 
was able to explain Peircian semiosis.  
To apply Rosen’s notion of causation to explaining semiosis requires some 
modification of the traditional Peircian categorization of sign, object and 
interpretant. In a generally favourable review of Søren Brier’s book, 
Cybersemiotics, a major work in biosemiotics, Salthe argued against the usual 
application of the categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in 
characterizing semiotics, with the sign being Firstness, the object Secondness 
and the Interpretant Thirdness: 
While all three categories would in principle be present simultaneously in all 
situations, there is a sense of First being—first!, in some sense a primordial 
ground, even if it is temporally synchronic with the other categories in many 
applications. A materialist cannot feel the justness of a sign that ‘stands for’ 
something to some other entity [“... whereby a first and a second are brought 
into relation...” (Peirce CP, 6.32-3)] implicitly antedating that which it stands for. 
… [C]learly the object (which could be a process or relationship) would need to 
be First, and, furthermore, it needs to be confronted by a material / physical 
system of some kind if it is to be interpreted. This is why I have advanced the 
‘system of interpretance’ … as the creator of interpretants and as co-creator, with 
the object, of the sign, which then becomes Third.118 
While this does not accord with Peirce’s usual way of categorizing the 
components of semiosis, it does accord with Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology in 
 
116 Stuart Kauffman, ‘A Physics of Semantics’, Investigations, Oxford: OUP, 2000, p.114. 
117 Kauffman, ‘A Physics of Semantics’, p.111. 
118 Stanley N. Salthe, ‘Inside/Outside: Review of Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is Not Enough’, by Søren 
Brier, University of Toronto Press, 2008’, Biosemiotics, 2(2), July, 2009: 247-253. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 68 
which he characterized ‘germinal being’, a flux of ‘absolutely undefined and 
unlimited possibility -- boundless possibility’119 as Firstness, with ‘Actual reactive 
existence’ of ‘objects’ or ‘existents’ that resist actions emerging from this, 
forming a dyadic relation, belonging to the category of Secondness. This 
Secondness was then seen as the precondition for the emergence of signs by 
which these ‘objects’ could be related to each other and thereby their 
behaviour predicted. Here, as Salthe argued, signs belong to the category of 
Thirdness rather than Firstness.  
Rather than being materialist or Idealist, this accords with Schelling’s 
characterization of his philosophy as overcoming the oppositions between 
materialism and spiritualism, realism and Idealism. My contention is that this is 
how Peirce’s philosophy should be understood, germinal being corresponding 
to Schelling’s ‘unprethinkable Being’ and perhaps to the quantum vacuum, or 
to John Archibald Wheeler’s notion of quantum foam. Furthermore, as I have 
suggested, Peirce should have paid far more attention to how existents, which 
should be thought of as enduring processes maintaining structures or forms 
rather than ‘things’ or ‘objects’, continue in existence, following Schelling in 
recognizing some existents as ‘dead matter’ characterized by stable balances of 
opposing forces, others chaotic, and others, alive, actively maintaining their 
form in interaction with their environments. 
It is important to emphasise that Rosen, like Schelling, was totally rejecting 
Cartesian dualism, so that organism’s ‘ambience’ as he characterized its 
environment, was not seen as totally separate from it, but as a differentiation 
within a broader process by which the organism separates itself and maintains 
this separation within this process, in so doing, dividing the subjective from the 
objective.120 In this process, the organism has to maintain a model of itself, with 
this model being part of this process while being partially autonomous and 
having this autonomy maintained. The model as the condition for the 
organism to differentiate itself from the ambient environment, modelling this 
differentiation and the relationship between the organism and its ambiance, not 
 
119 C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, 8 Vols. Ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, A. W. Burks, Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1931-1966, (electronic version), 6.127. 
120 This is described by Rosen in ‘Drawing the Boundary Between Subject and Object: Comments on the 
Mind-Brain Problem’, in: Essays on Life Itself, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, ch.5. 
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just in the present but in the future, thereby anticipating developments in this 
ambience and in itself and responding to what has been anticipated, is not just 
a sign but a sign complex of ‘ Dicisigns’. Dicisigns are signs combining two 
signs, relating to the same object but in different ways and forming an 
irreducible whole.121 Sign complexes can consist of codes and cognitive 
structures. As such they facilitate the production of more specific signs involved 
in a process of distinguishing significant aspects within the organism and within 
its ambient environment, anticipating and then responding to what is 
anticipated by constraining activity in the present. In doing so, organisms 
produce chemicals, grow, move and act, and in some cases, internalizing action 
to think and engage in critical dialogue. This ‘activity’ involves creating, 
maintaining, modifying and then reproducing structures which make such 
semiotic ‘activity’ possible. This ‘activity’ in turn creates, maintains, modifies 
and reproduces these structures, including models in all their complexity.  
What is responded to and to some extent causes the response can be 
characterized as the ‘Dynamical Object’, following Peirce, but following 
Schelling, would be better characterized as the ‘dynamical process’, a 
‘community of causation’ that includes the differentiation by the organism from 
its environment and also what is differentiated in this environment. That is, 
following Schelling, Peirce should have addressed the fundamental problem of 
individuation (a problem which he clearly recognized) as a condition for, and 
what can be augmented by, semiosis. This ‘dynamical process’ appreciated as 
such can allow that we ourselves, in trying to understand this process, are part 
of what we are striving to understand, achieving thereby self-understanding.122  
In light of advances in the Schelling tradition of science, this dynamical 
process should be seen as, among other things, a transformation of negentropy 
into entropy as characterized by Ilya Prigogine, with the organism organized to 
 
121 That Dicisigns are central to biology has been argued by Frederik Stjernfeld. See ‘The Evolution of 
Semiotic Self-Control: Sign Evolution as the Ongoing Refinement of the Basic Argument Structure of 
Biological Metabolism’, The Semiotic Species Evolved, Biosemiotics 6, ed. Thresa Schilhab, Frederik Stjernfelt 
and Terrence Deacon, Springer, 2012, ch.3, p.44f.  
122 This whole issue was taken up again by Gilbert Simondon who, while focussing on information, 
defined it is such a way that it could be seen as commensurable with Schellingian thought and thereby 
with Peircian biosemiotics. See Yuk Hui, ‘The Parallax of Individuation: Simondon and Schelling’, 
Angelika: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 21(4), 2016: 77-89. 
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partially control and utilize this transformation to maintain structures able to 
control this transformation to serve its own continued existence. In being taken 
into account and responded to by the organism, which is also a component of 
this dynamical process, aspects of this dynamical process come to be accorded 
significance as one or more Immediate Objects, or ‘proto-objects’ in the case of 
single-celled organisms, plants and simple multi-celled organisms (such as the 
appreciation by paramecium of acidity associated with carbonic acid, which 
functions as a sign of where food can be found and ingested). The response 
based on anticipation through the model, or specific signs facilitated by this 
model, is the interpretant of the object or proto-object (in the case of 
paramecium, making more turns to keep it in the vicinity of food), reproducing 
this specific sign and the entire model, or possibly, a modified, improved sign, 
conforming to Peirce’s triadic characterization of semiosis.  
It is through explaining this process and interpreting it as an example of 
semiosis that Rosen’s notion of causation explains not only the triadic nature of 
semiosis as characterized by Peirce, but how the end of the semiotic process 
remains related to the beginning. In the differentiation of systems from their 
ambience and maintaining this through models of themselves in their 
environments, aspects of dynamical objects of this community of causation of 
which organisms are part are accorded significance through modelling activity, 
and to some extent the dynamical objects are the efficient causes of the 
interpretants of what is signified, without being completely separate from or 
being completely determined by them. They are caused by them only insofar as 
the interpretants conform to some extent to pre-existing models which, also 
through constraining of activity, are sustaining the partial autonomy of these 
living systems from their ambience, enabling them to respond effectively to 
what has then become their worlds. The models, which are not only signs but 
also interpretants (or complexes of these), are maintained and developed over a 
longer duration than particular instances of semiosis, linking together each act 
of semiosis. 
As signs or sign systems, models also relate to each other as signs, that is, in 
Rosen’s terminology, syntactically, while simultaneously being produced as 
signs by dynamical objects or processes and signified aspects of these. Retaining 
a memory of the past and anticipating the future of what they model and being 
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kept in existence, models also are involved in constraining (without completely 
determining) the activities of these living systems, responding to what is 
anticipated, facilitating their survival, repair and reproduction. In the process 
they can be further developed, along with the living systems of which they are a 
part. Metabolism, repair and reproduction as processes are components of each 
other made possible by models that constrain them, but not reducible to each 
other, keeping each other in existence, each performing a function. They are 
‘closed to efficient causation’, in Rosen’s sense. As such, a living process with its 
semiosis cannot be reduced to nothing but the change from one state of a 
system to another, which simply replaces the original state (as physicists since 
Newton have conceived physical processes). It is a process that involves a 
triadic causation with relations between relations. As Eliseo Fernádez has 
cogently argued, such relations can only be recognized as possible when 
relations are recognized as real, and entities are only real in relation to other 
entities.123 Models continue to guide by constraining activities of the living 
system to realize selected possibilities, and possibly, reveal new possibilities. 
And as Fernádez pointed out, this is ‘modulation’, a ‘more general form of 
regulation, in which one process exerts continuous regulation upon another process.’124 
This is semiosis as Peirce characterized it, with models as signs being 
continually active as constraints and relating the beginning of any instance of 
semiosis to its end, the completed interpretant. 
AVOIDING THE ‘FALLACY OF MISPLACED CONCRETENESS’ 
This interpretation of Peircian semiosis through Rosen’s characterization of 
causation and vice versa is simplified for clarification, incorporating the 
simplifications of both Rosen’s and Peirce’s own theories. These simplifications 
should be recognized as abstractions, and as Alfred North Whitehead warned 
in identifying the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, should not be taken as 
concrete reality. In developing his theory, Rosen was considering models in 
relation to the most basic forms of life, a single cell, while Peirce characterized 
 
123 Eliseo Fernández, ‘Taking the Relational Turn: Biosemiotics and Some New Trends in Biology’, 
Biosemtiotics, 3, 2010: 147-156, p.151. 
124 Eliseo Fernández, ‘Evolution of signs, organisms and artifacts as phases of concrete generalization’, 
Biosemiotics, 8, 2015:91-102, p.94. 
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semiosis to begin with as one semiotic act in abstraction from all other acts of 
semiosis, although his whole approach was designed to show how each semiotic 
act, being itself a sign, lent itself to further semiosis. Furthermore, Rosen’s 
relational approach to life focussing on heterarchy abstracted away from 
material causes and from different hierarchical levels which are both essential 
to heterarchical levels and interact with them. Such simplifying abstractions 
and simplifications are necessary to illuminate the principles that are operating. 
Simplifying abstractions are a necessary part of science, the fruitfulness of 
which is exemplified in the work of Galileo and Newton, particularly in 
Newton’s explanation of the observations of Mars as due to it elliptical orbit 
around the Sun explained by his three laws of motion, ignoring all other bodies 
in the solar system. Such abstractions were enormously fruitful in Bohr’s model 
of the atom based on quantum theory, focussing on the simplest atom, 
hydrogen, and initially ignoring relativity theory.  
In reality, there is more to even the most primitive forms of life than 
metabolism, repair and reproduction and the model that is an essential 
component of these processes. And semiosis involves complexes of semiotic acts 
usually in hierarchical order, with particular semiotic activities taking place in 
the context of broader semiotic activities (or, using the language of von 
Uexküll, functional circles), and models as characterized by Rosen and 
interpreted as Peircian signs should be understood accordingly. This is one 
reason why Peircian biosemioticians embraced the work of Gregory Bateson, 
who in seeing living beings as communicative systems by themselves had also 
implicitly recognized the triadicity of relations in semiosis without using this 
vocabulary.125 What Bateson added along with cybernetics was an appreciation 
of the complexity of semiosis. As L .E. Bruni wrote in his contribution to the 
biosemioticians’ anthology on Bateson, A Legacy of  Living Systems, characterizing 
Bateson’s appreciation of this complexity: 
Semiosis or communication processes are multidimensional, i.e., innumerable 
semiotics processes occur at the same time in multiple directions and emergent 
levels. Some of them may intersect; others may not … Semiotic networks can be 
temporally and spatially separated and still be in communication. Or they can be 
causally linked although they belong to (or can be identified at) different levels of 
 
125 See Jesper Hoffmeyer, ‘From Thing to Relations. On Bateson’s Bioanthropology’, in A Legacy of Living 
Systems, ed. Jesper Hoffmeyer, 2008, ch.2, p.30ff. 
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the biological hierarchy. Therefore it is not an easy task to delimit a semiotic 
network.126 
Some idea of this complexity can be gained by thinking about the most 
primitive multi-celled organism, the slime mould which spends part of its life as 
a single-celled organism and part as a multi-celled organism.127 Single cells 
which germinate from spores function as individual amoeba until they run 
short of food. They all produce a chemical, acrasin, to which they are attracted, 
and an enzyme, acrinase which destroys the acrasin, and increase the 
production of acrasin as they run short of food. The resulting concentration of 
acrasin destabilizes the homogenous distribution of acrasin, and thereby of 
amoebae. A dissipative structure which attracts the amoebae into an aggregate 
has been formed. This aggregate forms plasmodium in which the number of 
cells are conserved and are largely unaltered, but which  then differentiate. The 
fluctuations generated by the interaction of acrasin and acrasinase and the 
effect of these on individual cells have generated a morphogenetic field in 
which cells develop differently according to their positions in the field. In this 
way a foot, a stem and a seed pod are formed. The pod eventually produces 
new spores which are then disseminated into its environment. From Rosen’s 
perspective, each cell will have a model of itself, but there will also be an 
emergent model of the multi-celled organism. Each cell will have an Umwelt 
based on sensitivity to food, to acrasin and to other cells, which in turn will be 
influenced by the response of the multi-celled organism to its own emergent 
Umwelt. Analysing all this into individual acts of semiosis will be impossible 
without taking into account hierarchy and heterarchy, and each act of semiosis, 
including protosemiosis, will only be fully comprehensible in this context. 
How each cell develops and behaves, both as a separate amoebae and as 
part of a multi-celled organism will be partly interpretants of its DNA and its 
codes which can be regarded as signs or sign complexes of the environment in 
which this organism has to survive and reproduce. Hoffmeyer argued on the 
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basis of an enormous amount of research into heredity, there is no simple 
relation between the sequence of nucleotide bases in DNA and proteins 
produced, let alone phenotypic characteristics.128 Alexei Sharov argued that 
endosemiosis involving communication between molecules as the most 
primitive form of semiosis or ‘protosemiosis’ (as opposed to ‘eusemiosis’), 
without anything like objects being referred to, requires a more basic theory of 
semiosis than provided by Peirce, and invoked the work of the Italian 
semiotician Giorgio Prodi.129 However, Prodi was strongly influenced by Peirce 
and formulated his ideas through Peirce’s triadic categories of Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness although he was critical of a residual Cartesianism 
in Peirce, and Sharov still utilized Peircian categorizations of signs, arguing for 
recognition of proto-icons, proto-indexes and proto-symbols among proto-
signs.130  
What is defined as the ‘external world’ in the process of an organism 
differentiating itself from its ambience will vary immensely between organisms. 
The Umwelt of a cell or plant will not consist of anything as complex as an 
‘object’, and there is a complete absence of spatiality, while the Umwelt of an 
animal or person which does consist of immediate objects and spatiality, these 
objects are what are focussed on as part of Gestalten. They are recognized 
against a background, including the proprioceptive sense of being spatially 
positioned as embodied agents with a shared world in process of becoming 
within a complex of processes in which these immediate objects are situated 
and related to each other. 
Signs as interpretants as Peirce conceived them involve and incorporate 
increasingly rich interpretative schemes. Such schemes have been described by 
Jean Piaget, someone whose work tends to be ignored by biosemioticians but 
whose significance has been recognized in the study of anticipatory systems.131 
 
128 Hoffmeyer, ‘The Semiotics of Heredity’.  
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The immediate objects signified by these signs themselves develop with the 
development of signs. This can be seen with the evolution of the notion of the 
atom as a theoretical object in physics and chemistry, but they could also be 
seen in the evolution of Umwelten of primitive organisms. Furthermore, all this 
takes place in the context of and as part of other processes operating over a vast 
range of scales from the expanding universe to quantum fluctuations in the 
vacuum, along with the processes and structures they maintain with various 
degrees of stability. These are the material causes of semiosis and life, largely 
ignored by Rosen, along with the structures and mechanisms utilized in 
semiosis and life, including the chemical bonds of DNA and its code and the 
interactions between the genome and the developing organism.132 Different 
scales are operative in life itself, with DNA within a cell in a multi-celled 
organism, along with its code, being relatively stable, functioning as a sign 
vehicle (or at least part of a sign vehicle) for the semiosis of the cell, for the 
organism as a whole (with the interpretant being the ontogenetic trajectory of 
the fertilized egg), for the organism’s species where each individual organism is 
an ‘experiment’ of the species, and for the ecosystem in which the species itself 
is an ‘experiment’.  
Another important aspect of semiosis not brought out by Rosen’s modelling 
is their ‘social’ dimension – semiosis involves communication with interpretants 
being by different individuals. Rosen’s starting point is the role of models in 
repair, and this does not appear to involve communication or be social in any 
way. However, it is this capacity for repair of the repair process that makes 
reproduction possible, in which the model of the original organism is 
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bequeathed to its progeny, functioning as a sign of the progeny’s environment 
in which it must survive and the means to do so, and the developing progeny is 
an interpretant.133 This accords with Peirce’s suggestion that ‘a Sign may be 
defined as a Medium for the communication of Form.’134 Repair can be seen as 
a form of communication between the organism at different times, integrating 
and thereby individuating the life of the organism. That is, semiosis associated 
with repair by virtue of a Rossanean model is a form of communication, even if 
only between different stages in the life of a particular organism. The model 
associated with this could be seen as the most primitive iconic sign and the 
condition for all other signs and forms of semiosis in organisms, illuminating 
how semiosis opens a new dimension of existence in sign relations, introducing 
formal causes as well as final causes. This concurs with Fernádez’s 
characterization of such semiosis: ‘No pattern exists in disembodied forms, but 
the same pattern may become successively embodied into different vehicles of 
form communication.’135 
Semiosis as communication is absolutely central to the functioning and 
evolution of ecosystems, and it has been argued that organisms themselves are 
tightly integrated ecosystems.136 The bonds of ecosystems are semiotic bonds, 
niches are largely (although not entirely) semiotic niches, and as Hoffmeyer 
argued, their development involves semiotic scaffolding which is the condition 
for further evolution.137 It is semiosis that makes possible increasingly complex 
forms of symbiosis and of the synergies these make possible. Acknowledging 
this should not involve blindness to other dimensions of evolution. Niches are 
also made up of structural forms made possible by physical processes, by what 
is edible (animals can’t eat coal), and so on, and along with symbiosis, there is 
also some competitive struggle for survival, with semiosis often being associated 
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with deception. In the case of humans, the ‘symbolic species’ as Terrence 
Deacon characterized them, ‘objects’ can also be imagined, hypothetical 
entities or totally unreal, and new levels of semiotic distortion and deception 
are made possible.138  ‘Objects’ in the ‘external worlds’ of humans include ‘self’ 
and communities, institutions, money, nation-states, texts, ideals and imaginary 
worlds created by art and other such entities that only exist as social realities 
through being symbolically signified, a dimension of reality only 
comprehensible when the triadicity of semiotic relations are acknowledged (as it 
was by George Herbert Mead, influenced indirectly by Peirce, along with the 
symbolic interactionists Mead inspired).139 This is what makes humans peculiar, 
as Walker Percy pointed out.140 While Peirce always acknowledged that 
semiosis is associated with communication, even his analysis of communication 
is still abstract when compared to the work of semioticians such as Yuri 
Lotman and Mikhail Bakhtin focussing on cultural life, including fictional 
narratives, as Oliver Laas has pointed out.141 Recognizing narratives is essential 
to properly understanding human communities as anticipatory systems, since it 
is through ‘anticipating narratives’ that humans anticipate the future and 
respond to what they anticipate. As Mario Giampietro pointed out, ‘Narratives 
play the same role in the semiotic process of human societies as schemata play 
in biosemiotics.’142 
Once the basic principles have been understood through abstract models it 
becomes possible to model mathematically much more complex forms of life, 
and work is underway in this regard. André Ehresmann and Jean-Paul 
Vanbremeersch have developed more complex models exploiting the deeper 
potential of Category Theory in their study of ‘memory evolutive systems’ 
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involving hierarchy, emergence and the development of cognition.143 Guided 
by Gerald Edelman’s work in neuroscience, most importantly, his explanation 
of experience as being a ‘remembered present’,144 this brings out even more 
clearly how interpretants of signs are realizations of previous anticipated 
possibilities. Along similar lines but completely independently it has been 
argued by Sonoda, Kodam and Gunji that awareness is made possible by 
heterarchy.145 Rosen himself has considered the models utilized by societies to 
define reality and make decisions, arguing for the value of his work for 
democratic politics.146  
However, understood as Peircian signs, models are not simply maintained 
and reproduced in repairing and reproducing organisms, but as interpretants 
can differ in significant ways from the original models as signs responded to by 
interpretants. As Peirce suggested, interpretants, having to deal with random 
perturbations and chance as well as predictable tendencies, can be more 
developed signs. It is impossible to fully capture creative responses 
mathematically since new possibilities come into existence. Semiosis can result 
in an intepretant grasping an adjacent possible different from any possibilities 
realized in the past, creating new niches and opening up new possibilities for 
evolution. As Stuart Kauffman argued, there can be no entailing laws for this.147 
Also, as the Estonian semiotician, Yuri Lotman, argued, the triadic forms of 
semiosis focussed on by Peirce can be superseded by pluralist forms.148 Finally, 
as Salthe showed, through the interpolation of new constraints that reproduce 
themselves, new kinds of beings can come into existence.  
Such complexes of semiotic acts and emergence of new levels need to be 
 
143 André Ehresmann and Jean-Paul Vanbremeersch, Memory Evolutive Systems: Hierarchy, Emergence, 
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144 Gerald M. Edelman, The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness, New York: Basic Books, 
1989. 
145 Kohel Sonoda, Kentaro Kodama and Yukio-Pegio Gunji, ‘Awareness as observational heterarchy’, 
Frontiers in Psychology, 4(686), Oct. 2013: 1-12. 
146 Robert Rosen, ‘Some Temporal Aspects of Political Change’, Int. J. General Systems, 1, 1974: 93-103. 
147 Stuart Kauffman, ‘From Physics to Semiotics’, In: Gatherings in Biosemiotics, ed. Silver Rattasepp and 
Tyler Bennett, Tartu: University of Tartu Press, pp.27-46, p.36ff. 
148 On this see Kalevi Kull, ‘Advancements in Biosemiotics: Where we are now discovering the basic 
mechanisms of meaning making’. In: Gatherings in Biosemiotics. Ed. Silver Rattasepp and Tyler Bennett, 
Tartu: University of Tartu Press, 2012, pp.11-24, p.16. 
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described through semiotic models and through stories to capture this 
complexity. Here, ‘signs’ can be ‘texts’, and have been characterized as such 
utilizing Peircian semiotic theory by Paul Ricoeur.149 That is, it is necessary to 
recognize the value to biology not only of traditional Peircian biosemiotics, but 
also of the biohermeneuticists, exemplified by the work of Anton Markoš.150 
Through Rosen’s work it is now possible to defend scientifically and clarify 
through mathematics both the limitations of mathematics and the cognitive 
value of non-mathematical semiotic models, literary texts and stories.  
Semiosis as it is now understood by biosemioticians involves the production 
of various chemicals in cells (and turning on and off such production), changing 
the permeability of membranes, producing and reproducing and developing 
particular structures and swarming or bonding with other cells, the growth of 
plants and also other multi-celled organisms, for instance, growing down to 
water and up towards sunlight using gravity as a sign, or growth of animals into 
forms enabling effective action in their environments which are then 
‘experienced’ as their Umwelten,151 the actions of animals and humans as 
responses to what is recognized in these Umwelten, for instance, avoiding 
predators and obtaining food, and in the symbolic activities of humans as 
cultural beings. Semiosis involving the more complex forms of signs, the signs 
of culture; that is, symbols which can generate cultural entities such as 
narratives, idealizations and ideologies and abstract terms associated with these. 
It is this realm that the insights of the structuralist semioticians influenced by 
Saussure achieve some relevance. The signs of culture can create the illusion 
that signs and subjects are disembodied, but as Kalevi Kull noted, ‘Humans 
possess simultaneously vegetative, animal, and cultural semiosis.’152 The series 
of semiotic thresholds, vegetative, animal and culture, could be explained as the 
 
149 Paul Ricoeur, ‘What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding’. In Paul Ricoeur: Hermeneutics & the 
Human Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson, Cambridge: CUP, 1981, ch.5, p.163. 
150 Anton Markoš, Readers of the Book of Life: Contextualizing Developmental Evolutionary Biology, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, and with others, ‘Towards a Darwinian Biosemiotics: Life as Mutual 
Understanding’, Introduction to Biosemiotics, ed. Barbieri, 2008, ch.10. 
151 See Daniel Chamowitz, What a Plant Knows: A Field Guide to the Senses, New York: Scientific American, 
2012. 
152 Kalevi Kull, ‘Vegetative, Animal, and Cultural Semiosis: The Semiotic Threshold Zones’, Cognitive 
Semiotics, Issue 4, Spring, 2009: 8-27: p.24. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 80 
emergence of new levels of heterarchy, combining hierarchy and heterarchy, 
associated with not only new levels of constraint but new forms of reflexivity 
supervening over but only made possible through the functioning of more 
primitive forms of semiosis. The expansion of semiotic capacities associated 
with these new levels involve a concomitant increase in organisms’ powers for 
causal intervention and active engagement with their environments. Humans 
are, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and later Mark Johnson and George Lakoff 
argued, embodied subjects. Signs, and we as subjects relating signs to each 
other in worlds that are largely the products of signs, such as texts, money, 
states, political movements, scientific research programs, nations and 
civilizations, even when simply reflecting without acting, are inescapably 
incarnate and are built on and require the continued semiosis of individual 
human cells.  
Human semiosis includes everyday practical activities such as 
transformations of the physical world, the production of goods, speech acts, the 
production and interpretation of narrative texts, and the development, 
deployment and utilization of more abstract models, including mathematical 
and other scientific models, opening up new levels of freedom.153 ‘Subjects’ and 
worlds of Immediate Objects co-emerge with the capacity of organisms for 
greater anticipation involving more complex models, more complexly 
differentiated worlds, and greater capacity to respond to what is anticipated, 
and also a greater capacity to modify their models and their worlds. This is 
associated with more complex kinds of signs as described by Peirce and 
explicated by Thellefsen. The development of human culture characterised by 
‘with’ worlds (Mitwelten) or life-worlds (Lebenswelten) involving the dialectics of 
labour, recognition and representation crystalized in institutions, again being 
components of each other without being reducible to each other, magnify the 
possibilities for freedom and creative semiosis.154 These in turn make possible 
reflexivity, generating ‘self’ worlds (Eigenwelten) in which people come to 
 
153 The transformations of the physical world to produce built-up environments are not usually 
characterized as semiosis, but I have argued they should be with reference to and interpreting the work of 
the architectural theorist, Christopher Alexander. See ‘The Arts and the Radical Enlightenment: Gaining 
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154 See Arran Gare, ‘Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics and Political Philosophy in an Age of Impending 
Catastrophe’, Cosmos & History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol.5 (2), 2009: 264-286 
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understand themselves as individuals living out unfinished stories that can be 
reflected upon and modified, taking responsibility for themselves and their 
communities. Understood through biosemiotics, all this can be seen as 
participation in the semiosphere of the Earth whereby the Earth as a living 
being is becoming conscious of itself and its significance through humans. As 
Giampietro argued, anticipatory narratives explicitly acknowledging this are 
required to put in place the constraints necessary for preserving the ecosystems 
in which are participants.155 
BARBIERI, CODE BIOLOGY AND PEIRCIAN BIOSEMIOTICS 
What are the implications of this Rosennean perspective for code biology, and 
for Barbieri’s criticisms of Peircian biosemiotics? Barbieri’s main objection to 
Peircian biosemiotics is that it involves simply playing with words, deploying a 
vocabulary that attributes far more to biological processes than is justified on 
the basis of a strictly scientific investigation, and that it does not lead to any 
new observations or any new conjectures that are testable. Most importantly, 
Barbieri objects to the attribution of interpretation to these processes. His main 
argument against this pertains to codes, the focus of his own interests. 
Identifying a code ubiquitous in biology for producing proteins from DNA, for 
instance, but also many other codes, does not require anything like 
interpretation. Furthermore, he argues that this code can be seen as part of a 
mechanism for producing proteins, and he objects to the opposition claimed by 
Peircian biosemioticians between their own position and mechanistic 
explanations, and to the assumption that mechanistic explanations are 
reductionist. In his defence of his critique of Peircian biosemiotics, he includes 
Rosen as someone who conflates mechanistic explanations with reductionism. 
I will begin with what I believe to be a valid claim by Barbieri – that 
mechanistic explanations are not reductionist. Michael Polanyi pointed out that 
this is not the case. No matter how much we study the chemistry of a machine 
we will never understand the machine because the machine involves ordering 
principles that utilize the boundary conditions of chemical interactions.156 
 
155 Giampietro, ‘Anticipation in Agriculture’, in Poli ed. Handbook of Anticipation, ch.52. 
156 Michael Polanyi, ‘Life’s Irreducible Structure’, in Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, ed. Marjorie 
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Scientists who believe they are upholding reductionism fail to appreciate this 
because they tacitly presuppose the reality of the higher level of ordering that 
they are trying to explain, and ignore the boundary conditions (or constraints) 
they put in place in constructing their experiments. This insight was one of the 
main starting points for Pattee’s own work. Subsequently, leading opponents of 
reductionism have endorsed the quest for mechanistic explanations. Roy 
Bhaskar, for instance, a vigorous opponent of reductionism in the human 
sciences, argued that the aim of science is to discover the generative 
mechanisms that produce various outcomes.157 Barbieri pointed out that the 
code for translating DNA into protein could not be understood through 
physical laws; the code is in a sense conventional. It is ‘as set of rules that 
establish a correspondence between two independent worlds.’158 However, coding and 
decoding are still operations that can be explained mechanistically - for 
instance, there are mechanisms for the production of particular kinds of 
proteins utilizing DNA and coding rules. They are some of the material causes 
of life, and as such, are largely ignored by Rosen’s relational biology and by 
many (but not all) biosemioticians. Hoffmeyer for instance refers with approval 
to Brian Goodwin’s observation that one gene in the hair cell of the inner ear of 
a chick can produce 576 proteins by reading the sequence of bases in the DNA 
in different ways.159 
The point though is that mechanistic explanations already assume a telos 
that mechanisms in some sense serve. They are products of life. The heart, for 
instance, is a mechanism for pumping blood through the body, and is 
significant as necessary for all the other ends the organism might have. And the 
muscle cells of the heart contain the mechanisms that serve this goal of the 
heart. On Venus where there is no life there are no mechanisms and so no 
place for mechanistic explanations. Regulation through feedback, the basis of 
cybernetics, is also a mechanism, although as Søren Brier argued, it can be 
integrated with semiosis to produce cybersemiotic systems.160 If properly 
understood, even information only really makes sense in relation to living 
 
157 Bhaskar, 1978, passim. 
158 Barbieri, The Organic Codes, p.94. 
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beings,161 or more abstractly, to ‘memory evolutive systems’.162 As Bateson 
characterized information, it is a difference that makes a difference. 
‘Information’ as conceived by Shannon, is the material condition for such 
information. The proponents of the synthetic theory of evolution, exemplified 
in its extreme form by Richard Dawkins, attempted to eliminate the need for 
recognizing such a telos by explaining existing mechanical order as the 
outcome the survival of the fittest machines, but they either surreptitiously 
reintroduced teleology (for instance, Dawkins treating DNA as having a 
purpose) or the theory became a tautological claim that what survives must be 
the fittest for survival because it survives.  
Barbieri is clearly not guilty of such incoherence, but his book The Organic 
Codes shows how difficult it is to account for the origins of life and explain the 
‘Eigen’s paradox’ (how the complexity required for the DNA code to function 
as such could have originated) within the framework of his code biology alone 
(although his latest work on ambiguity reduction grapples with this problem).163 
Granting a place to mechanisms, recognizing that mechanistic explanations are 
not reductionist, still requires acknowledgement and explanation of final causes 
to identify them as having a function, which was Rosen’s main concern. 
Functions and the quest to fulfil them precedes the development of 
mechanisms, including codes, and once developed, mechanisms can be 
appropriated for other functions, as when swim bladders were utilized to 
absorb oxygen and became lungs, or when human language was used to create 
philosophy. Characterized as ‘exaptation’, this is now recognized as central to 
evolution. 
The early stages of the emergence of life as dissipative structures are most 
likely to have involved the autocatalytic sets characterized by chemical 
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reactions mutually catalysing each other as described by Stuart Kauffman, but 
achieving endurance and effectiveness through emergent constraining activities 
in hierarchical order as described by Pattee and Salthe (for instance, associated 
with the formation of a semipermeable membrane enclosing these reactions). 
Here, energy transformations would be controlled to some degree, storing 
energy in usable form such that its transformation could be triggered, to hasten 
the overall transformation of exergy into entropy and its dissipation. This 
would be the condition for the more complex processes involving heterarchy as 
well as hierarchy, and thereby reflexivity as characterized by Rosen associated 
with the capacity to anticipate and respond to future possibilities, bringing the 
final causes of life and semiotic controls into the world. This would be 
associated with the development of Umwelten, later including ‘objects’ and then 
spatiality, and correspondingly, the development of subjectivity associated with 
increasing levels of curiosity, emotional engagement and freedom of agency. 
With the concomitant emergence of functions, anything that better serves a 
useful function, including functioning as a sign vehicle or code, would have 
survival value and be selected for and refined. The role of DNA would be, as 
Salthe argued, ‘to stabilize spontaneously emergent material forms and to 
provide access to structural attractors, which is to say, to harness informational 
constraints present generally in nature.’164 This would include the tendencies of 
physical processes to generate forms, such as the rigid forms of chemical 
structures utilized in producing bones of skeletons, or the transparent slightly 
modified spheres of eyes, the focus of theorists of morphogenesis such as Brian 
Goodwin.165  It is almost certain that analogue codes pre-existed the digital 
codes of DNA with RNA functioning as a messenger, with these being utilized 
to provide greater stability to vegetative semiosis, although if, as Barbieri 
argues, life originated with ribonucleoproteins, there could have been elements 
of digital coding in the original analogue coding of life. Hoffmeyer argued that 
analogue codes continue to play a role as codes, interacting with digital codes, 
 
164 Stanley N. Salthe, ‘What is the Scope of Biosemiotics? Information in Living Systems’. In Introduction to 
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all the way up to human culture.166 Final causes are also the condition for the 
Baldwin effect and semiotic scaffolding, without which the evolution that has 
taken place could not be explained.167  
Recognizing that mechanistic explanations through the fractionated 
components of a living system are also necessary and are not reductionist, as 
Rosen thought, is not a major argument against Rosen, because the emergence 
of final causes or teleology still requires the kind of functional order which he 
showed cannot be understood in terms of fractionated components. There is 
still a requirement for the kind of modelling of anticipatory systems that Rosen 
offered. Such models lead to testable predictions because it can be shown that 
organisms are responding to what is anticipated rather than simply reacting to 
their environments. From this perspective, the codes and coding and decoding 
mechanisms identified by Barbieri that do not require any ascription of 
interpretation, can only be identified as codes, that is, as having a function, 
because they serve as instruments for a system which is more than a sum of the 
mechanisms it utilizes. Furthermore, recognizing them as having a function 
does not imply that the ‘meaning’ Barbieri associates with codes are nothing 
but functions. It can be argued that meaning is an emergent aspect of life 
required for it to function. 
If this is right, Barbieri’s argument that genuine science always involves 
constructing mechanistic models, that ‘Mechanism, in short, is virtually 
equivalent to the scientific method … Mechanism, in other words, is scientific 
modelling’168 cannot be accepted. There are a variety of forms of explanation 
that have been accepted at times in science: deductive-nomological, 
mechanistic, causal, probabilistic, dynamical, functional, semantic and 
topological, to name a few. Barbieri’s claim would not only rule out major work 
in biology, such as C.H. Waddington’s and Brian Goodwin’s work on 
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epigenesis invoking morphogenetic fields with their immanent dynamics169 and 
Walter Freeman’s and Giuseppe Vitiello’s work in neuroscience utilizing 
quantum field theory and invoking cortical fields, but most of physics since 
Faraday. In developing his notion of force fields, Faraday was upholding the 
tradition of Schellingian science in rejecting not only the pre-eminence 
accorded to Newtonian physics, but also the idea that explanations have to be 
mechanistic. James Clark Maxwell was under the influence of the older 
tradition of science, and while advancing Faraday’s work, occasionally lapsed 
into this earlier assumption and attempted to explain these force fields with 
mechanistic models, but abandoned this attempt.170 The development of 
relativity theory and then quantum theory put an end to such quests. The 
problem now is, as David Bohm noted at a conference on theoretical biology in 
1969: ‘just when physics is… moving away from mechanism, biology and 
psychology are moving closer to it. If the trend continues… scientists will be 
regarding living and intelligent beings as mechanical, while they suppose that 
inanimate matter is too complex and subtle to fit into the limited categories of 
mechanism.’171 Bohm was describing the triumph of the Schellingian tradition 
of speculative physics, and biosemiotics should be seen as at the forefront of 
advancing the tradition of Schellingian science. 
Even if Rosen were wrong in equating reductionism and mechanistic 
explanations, his argument that the kinds of mathematical models he was 
developing to understand anticipatory systems could not be simulated on a 
computer does offer a new insight into life, even if simulations have been 
offered. It is part of Rosen’s argument that mathematics should not be reduced 
to mere syntactical relations so that operations could be specified for the 
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manipulation of symbols without any reference beyond these symbols. 
Mathematics is important because it can give some insight into what is 
modelled by it. This is part of a broader argument, that living beings are not 
Turing machines. It is hardly surprising that defenders of mainstream biology 
and mathematics have treated this claim as a challenge and have made a 
number of efforts to simulate Rosen’s models on computers,172 some of which 
were discussed by Vega. Barbieri took issue with Vega on this point, claiming 
that simulations have been successful. However, what is centrally important for 
Rosen’s argument is not whether simulations are possible, but rather, whether 
such simulations could offer any insight into the causal entailments active in 
what they are simulating. Nowadays with powerful computers it is possible to 
simulate anything; but without providing insight into what is simulated, this is 
Ptolemaic science, simply adding the equivalent of epicycles to save the 
appearances rather than explaining these.173 Rosen’s ideas on mathematical 
modelling were focussed on how real entailments are modelled, knowing that 
all such modelling simplifies what is modelled.174 What is really important is 
that through his mathematical modelling Rosen revealed something about the 
nature of causation where multiple processes are operative simultaneously, 
being components of each other without being reducible to each other, and 
showing how these are required to explain final causes of anticipatory systems. 
It is this form of complexity that can then explain the triadic nature of semiosis. 
Furthermore, as I have also suggested above, Rosen’s study of modelling 
justifies recognizing the limits of all mathematics. To understand these and the 
semiotic activities they are describing it is also necessary to give a place to 
semiotic models as called for by Kull that accord a place to indeterminacy and 
creativity that cannot be acknowledged in mathematical models. And as 
Kauffman argued, it is necessary to invoke stories to characterize the creativity 
of the evolution of the biosphere where these cannot be accounted for through 
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entailing laws because they involve new possibilities, including exaptation.175 
Stories are also important for describing and appreciating striving, exploring 
new possibilities, conflicting goals, and the emotions involved in living, even in 
the case of single celled organisms such as the Stentor, as Kauffman argued.176  
However, it is still possible to accept Barbieri’s criticism of the loose use of 
anthropomorphic terms such as ‘interpretation’ that are taken to always imply 
some sense of subjectivity. This charge is connected to Barbieri’s scepticism 
about Peirce’s Objective Idealism, but even more importantly, his charge that 
biosemioticians are incoherent in accepting notions that are defensible if one 
accepts Objective Idealism, but are mere adornments to scientific theory when 
added to what he takes to be genuine scientific knowledge. It is a real problem 
when what to be purports to be research is merely redescribing what is already 
known in an obscurantist vocabulary, or alternatively, in the comforting 
vocabulary of folk biology. This problem has already been recognized by Claus 
Emmeche, a leading biosemiotician, who pointed out the parallels in this 
regard between complexity theory and biosemiotics on the one hand, and 
general systems theory in the 1960s and 70s on the other.177 However, 
biosemiotics is more than this, and this can be appreciated when Peirce’s claim 
to being an Objective Idealist is rejected. It is true that Peirce characterized 
himself as an Objective Idealist, perhaps seeing this as consistent with 
characterizing himself as a ‘Schellingian of some stripe’.178 However, as I have 
pointed out, Schelling in his struggle against Cartesian dualism (and reacting 
against Fichte’s Idealism) was developing a philosophy to overcome the 
oppositions between materialism and spiritualism, realism and Idealism. 
Building on the work of Schelling, Peirce was defending, although without 
explicitly stating this and not entirely consistently, what C.D. Broad later 
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characterized as ‘emergent neutralism’, developing an ontology by abstracting 
from the attributes of both mentality and matter in such a way that both the 
attributes of mentality and of matter could then be shown to have emerged 
from being so conceived.179 In his later work, when he was struggling to 
generalize the notion of sign by removing its anthropomorphism, this clearly 
characterizes Peirce’s own philosophy. This is the essence of process 
metaphysics which takes creative relational processes with real possibilities as 
the fundamental reality.180 And as Sandra Rosenthal has pointed out, despite 
Peirce’s claim to be an Idealist, but also a realist and a pragmaticist, none of 
these adequately characterize his philosophy.181 Rosenthal, like Nicholas 
Rescher, characterized it as process metaphysics.182 Advancing science through 
process metaphysics in opposition to science based on different metaphysical 
assumptions, accounting for their achievements, and going beyond these 
achievements, is a major challenge, and it has been in striving to meet this 
challenge that the hard cores of the research programs of biosemiotics and 
relational biology were formulated and are being defended here. 
Defending such a research program in a culture and social order 
embodying Cartesian dualism is difficult, and it is necessary to develop a 
language more basic than the language used to characterize either matter or 
mentality. In characterizing semiosis, Peirce used the term ‘interpretant’ rather 
than interpretation for precisely this reason (although not always 
consistently).183 As such, this concept can be applied to the production of 
proteins or the generation of form by an anticipatory system, that is, ‘vegetative 
semiosis’ that Barbieri assumed was precluded by the notion of 
‘interpretation’.184 Given the demonstrated incoherence of Cartesian dualism in 
which mind and matter are defined in such a way that any relationship 
between them, causal or otherwise, is incomprehensible (as demonstrated by 
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Princess Elizabeth of Austria and then Spinoza), the absurdity of reductionist 
materialism, denying the reality of our consciousness which is the condition of 
there being philosophy and science, and the implausibility of Idealism in the 
light of the success of evolutionary cosmology in which life is seen to have 
evolved from a universe originally without living beings, emergent neutralism is 
clearly the most plausible and defensible ontology. Barbieri can hardly claim 
that accepting emergent neutralism is incompatible with science, and this is 
surely what a good many of the Peircian biosemioticians have been upholding, 
even if occasionally lapsing into the language of Idealism or using language 
loosely. In fact it is clear that Barbieri is also engaged in this project, and his 
claim that the operation of codes in single celled organisms requires the 
ascription of ‘meaning’ to what is produced is part of the attempt to bridge this 
gap.  
There is far more at stake in overcoming Cartesian dualism than being able 
to develop biology. It is required to overcome the two cultures referred to by 
C.P. Snow - science on the one side, the humanities and the arts on the other, 
and to recognize that in developing our understanding of ourselves and our 
place in nature, including advancing our understanding of life, we are 
participating in creating the future. Biosemiotics is at the centre of this struggle 
to overcome Cartesian dualism and to overcome the rift between science and 
the humanities. Facing a global ecological catastrophe largely as a consequence 
of a culture dominated by Cartesian dualism, overcoming this opposition could 
be a necessary condition for humanity to continue having a future. And as 
Mario Giampietro has recently argued, the integration of biosemiotics with 
anticipatory systems theory provides the means to critically examine and revise 
our current anticipatory narratives in order to put in place the semiotic 
constraints required for maintaining this future.185 
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